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[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN A~TI FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIA_M R. SHORE, an 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ROBERTA SHORE, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 08-327 
MEMORI\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES' MOTION TO 
AMEND ANSWER 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS 
BOKIDES' MOTION TO AMEND ANS\VER 








COMES NOW the Third-Party Defendant, l\icholas Bokides, by and through 
undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Rules 15( a) and l 5(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and other applicable law, hereby moves this Court for an Order granting him leave to 
amend his Answer to include an affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore has brought a legal malpractice action against 
Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides. the parties have already submitted extensive 
briefing to the Court by way of dispositive motions, Third-Party Defendant will not reiterate all 
of the relevant facts and circumstances that give rise to this litigation, but rather, will focus on 
the narrow legal issue that is the subject of this motion. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure l 5(a) governs amendments to the pleadings. Rule 
15(a) states in part "a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires ... " The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The twin purposes behind the rule are to allow claims to be 
determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make 
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of 
the claim and the at issue. 
It is within the district court's sound discretion to decide whether 
to allow a party to amend its complaint after a responsive pleading 
has been served. "[I]n the interest of justice, district courts should 
favor liberal of to amend a complaint." 
Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 1 Idaho 866,871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 
( 1999) ( citations omitted). 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure l 5(b) states: 
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Rule 15(6 ). Amendments to conform to the evidence.-- When 
issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails 
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence. 
The decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a pleading is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997). In deciding 
whether to grant a motion for leave to amend, a trial court may consider whether the amended 
pleading sets out a valid claim, whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by any undue 
delay, or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim. Black 
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 
900, 904 (1991 ). 
While a court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added state a 
valid claim, the court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether leave 
should be granted. Thomas v. Med Ctr. Physicians, 138 Idaho 200,210, 61 P.3d 557 (2002) 
( citing Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 
804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991); Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 873, 993 
P.2d 1197, 1203 (1999). 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS TIMELY AND DOES NOT 
UNDULY PREJUDICE THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF. 
Under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c), a party must set forth in his pleading 
any affirmative defenses to the other party's pleading. "The purpose of this rule requiring that 
affirmative defenses be pleaded is to alert the parties about the issues of fact that will be tried and 
to afford them an opportunity to present evidence to meet these defenses." Nguyen v. Bui, 146 
Idaho 187, 191 (2008). While Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 8( c) requires a party to set forth in 
it's pleading any affirmative defenses to the other party's pleading, "I.R.C.P. 15(6) modifies the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 8(c)." Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 492 (1996). Rules 15(a) and 
15(6) clearly provide that when justice requires, a party may move to amend its pleading at any 
time. Rule 15(6) directs the court to look at whether the presentation of the merits of the case 
would be subserved by failure to allow the amendment, and whether the party opposing the 
amendment would be prejudiced in the presentation of his case. 
Although Third-Party Defendant's Answer did not specifically raise the 
affomative defense of failure to mitigate damages, the factual allegations supporting the 
affirmative defense are set forth in the Answer. These allegations are well known to the Third-
Party Plaintiff, and have already been the subject of extensive briefing to the Court by way of 
dispositive motions, by both parties 1. Additionally, the Court in its July 29, 2010 Memorandum 
1 The affirmative defense that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages was first 
raised by Third-Party Defendant in his March 10, 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment and 
subsequently argued in Roberta Shore's March 24, 2010 Response and Opposition to Third-Party 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In his June 10, 2010 response to Roberta Shore's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Third-Party Defendant again raised the affirmative defense that 
Roberts Shore's claims should be denied because she failed to mitigate her damages by pursuing 
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Decision and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment addressed whether Third-Party 
Defendant was entitled to summary judgment for Roberta Shore's failure to mitigate damages. 
Finally, the Joint Pre-trial Stipulation, submitted jointly by both parties, identifies whether 
Roberta Shore mitigated her damages as an issues of law to be litigated at trial. 
A review of the record shows that the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate 
was clear and that Third-Party Plaintiff was aware of the issue and consented to the issue being 
tried. See Nguyen at 191; Keller Lorenz Company, Inc. v. Insurance Associates Corporation, 98 
Idaho 678, 682 (1977). While the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages was not 
raised with specificity in the Third-Party Defendant's Answer, the issue has been clearly tried by 
the consent of the parties. Accordingly, the addition of this affirmative defense at this time will 
not unduly prejudice the Third-Party Plaintiff's ability to prepare for, or prosecute, their case at 
trial, nor will it delay the trial which is currently scheduled for August 24-26, 2010. Justice is 
served by allowing Third-Party Defendant to add the affirmative defense. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Third-Party Defendant respectfully requests that the 
Court grant his Motion to Amend Answer, and allow Third-Party Defendant leave to amend his 
Answer to include the additional affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages. 
her claims against Bill Shore. In her June 14, 2010 Reply Memorandum, Roberta Shore again 
argued that the duty to mitigate did not require her to file a complaint against her ex-husband. 
The issue was also argued before the Court at the hearing on both motions for summary 
judgment. 
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DATED this J}j_ day of August, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By /8.,( ~ 
Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
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INC., a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
corporation, WILLIAM R. SHORE an 
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Prior to the commencement of the Court trial, summary judgment motions were 
filed, briefed and argued to the Court. Third Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore (hereinafter 
referred to as "Roberta") does not believe it is necessary to repeat the arguments made 
in conjunction with the various summary judgment motions, but will confine her written 
argument to the application of facts presented at trial to the law as it pertains to the 
issues in this case. Simply stated, the Third Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides 
(hereinafter "Bokides") failed to notify McCormick International and Agricredit within a 
reasonable period of time after he was asked and agreed to provide written notification 
that Roberta no longer wished to be a guarantor of Bear River Equipment's obligations. 
Had Bok ides acted within a reasonable period of time after he was asked and agreed to 
provide such notifications, Roberta would not have been a Defendant in this action. 
Bokides freely admitted during cross examination that if he made the notifications he 
was requested to do prior to the end of October, 2006, Roberta would never have been 
named as a party by McCormick in this litigation. He failed to produce any rational, 
cogent explanation for his dilatory conduct resulting in her having a judgment rendered 
against her in the sum of $342,417.42 in her capacity as guarantor of Bear River 
Equipment. 
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Roberta had personal knowledge of her ex-husband, William Shore's, assets 
and liabilities as of the date of their divorce (November 16, 2006) and, subsequent 
thereto, as a result of numerous claims brought against herself and 1\/lr. Shore, in 
addition to McCormick, by various creditors of Bear River Equipment, including the IRS, 
the State of Idaho, Krone Equipment, Ireland Bank, Blake Adkins, and the law firm of 
Merrill & Merrill. Given her personal knowledge of the efforts and the settlements 
entered into with respect to these various creditors, this Court should not fault her for 
electing not to pursue William Shore via a third party claim in this case, assuming, for 
the sake of argument, she even had the legal right to do so. It was not unreasonable 
for Roberta to conclude that pursuing William Shore would not only be costly for her, 
but she would have no assurances that a third party complaint against him, even if 
successful, would result in her obtaining any money. As such, she did not fail to 
mitigate her damages by not pursuing William Shore. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Bokides' liability is virtually unchallenged. 
At trial, Bokides admitted that Roberta probably told him to send the letters to 
McCormick and Agricredit by at least May, 2006. He further admitted that had he done 
so by October of 2006, she would not be involved in this lawsuit. The defense, in prior 
submissions, has already admitted that seven of the eight tractors which form the basis 
of McCormick's claim against Bear River Equipment and, subsequently, William Shore 
and Roberta, were floored after the divorce decree was entered on November 16, 2006, 
and only one tractor was floored prior to the divorce, and that was in October, 2006. 
Initially, Mr. Bokides claimed that Bobbie brought him letters that she wanted him 
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to send to McCormick and Agricredit. At trial, he admitted that this was incorrect. He 
also claimed that he was concerned as to whether or not removing her as a guarantor 
during the pendency of the divorce would affect Bear River Equipment's business 
relationship with Agricredit or McCormick, yet he admitted that he did not contact either 
Agricredit or McCormick to see if her removal would affect their business relationships 
with Bear River. He provided no cogent explanation as to why it would be a good idea 
to wait until after the divorce was final for him to notify McCormick and Agricredit. He 
agreed that if a person came to see him for divorce and had credit cards, his advice to 
that person would be to immediately notify the credit card companies so as to avoid 
liability for additional charges. This is no different than notifying Agricredit and 
McCormick that Roberta no longer wanted to be a guarantor. Once this notification was 
accomplished, any debts incurred by Bear River after the notification would not be 
subject to her guarantee. In this case, ALL of the debts incurred by Bear River for 
which Roberta's guarantee applied were incurred after the divorce decree was entered 
or, in one case, shortly before. However, Bokides had a period of time, at least five 
months, in which he could have notified McCormick and Agricredit and eliminated 
Roberta's obligations under her guarantees completely. 
Bokides further provided no evidence of any discussion he had with Roberta in 
which she supposedly agreed to wait until after the divorce was entered to be removed 
as a guarantor on Bear River's obligation to McCormick and Agricredit (see Exhibit 
114). At trial, he acknowledged that she "probably" told him to send the letters to 
McCormick and Agricredit at least by May of 2006, which testimony completely refutes 
his earlier position that she did not ask him to be removed as a guarantor until after the 
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divorce was final. 
What is clear from Bokides' testimony in this proceeding is that he has changed 
his story concerning the underlying facts throughout this case and, when push comes to 
shove, could not deny or provide any corroboration for his various versions of the facts, 
nor could he cogently refute Roberta's clear unequivocal testimony concerning when 
she asked him to perform his tasks and whether or not she agreed to wait until after the 
divorce was over. Instead, his defense primarily consisted of a "blame the victim" 
strategy by chastising Roberta for not pursuing William Shore in order to relieve himself 
of having to compensate her for the damage he inflicted, which, by his own testimony, 
could absolutely have been avoided. 
II. Roberta acted reasonably in electing not to pursue William Shore. 
Roberta was married to William Shore for 15 years. According to her testimony, 
she was the marital bookkeeper. Unlike third party creditors, who by and large do not 
have first hand independent knowledge of a debtor's assets, Roberta, as a marital 
partner of William Shore, had full knowledge of both their assets and their liabilities. 
She knew the extent of the personal assets they acquired and she knew what they paid 
for their real property. Following their divorce, according to Roberta's uncontroverted 
testimony, she had personal knowledge as to the claims made against Bear River 
Equipment, by McCormick, Krone, Ireland Bank, the IRS, the State of Idaho, the law 
firm of Merrill & Merrill, McCormick, Blake Adkins Law Firm and had first hand 
knowledge of the manner, extent and methods by which the majority of these claims 
were settled. She was also involved in the litigation with Tom Lewis, the general 
manager of Bear River Equipment. 
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When she was first served with the Complaint in this matter demanding payment 
based upon her "personal guarantee" she acknowledged that she was informed by 
undersigned counsel that if she wanted to pursue a claim against William Shore 
pursuant to the indemnification provision of their divorce decree she would have to 
obtain the services of different counsel as Ringert Law Chartered was representing 
William Shore in this matter and could not represent Roberta in a claim against William 
Shore. Based upon her personal knowledge of William Shore's assets, as well as his 
liabilities, Roberta independently determined that it made no sense for her to assert a 
claim against William Shore as it would involve an expenditure of funds by her that she 
was not prepared to make and she saw very little and, in fact, no likelihood of actually 
recovering anything of value assuming she even could legally bring such a claim. 
Instead, she elected to retain Ringert Law Chartered to defend her against McCormick, 
attempt settlement with McCormick and, if not, pursue her Third-Party Complaint 
against Bokides as that, to her, was the most prudent cost effective course of action to 
take. Her decision in this regard is now the subject of Monday morning quarterbacking 
by Bokides. Considering she wouldn't have been placed in a position of having to 
decide whether or not to pursue William Shore, but for Bokides' negligence, this 
position is somewhat astounding. 
William Shore, during discovery in this case, provided counsel for Bokides a 
financial statement dated February of this year (Exhibit 113). At first blush, the financial 
statement appears to show a net worth of approximately $230,000. However, in order 
to arrive at this positive net worth, William Shore placed a value on the Council farm at 
$1,625,000.000, the Preston property at $220,000.00 and various pieces of used farm 
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machinery and equipment at more than $140,000.00. At trial, William Shore 
acknowledged that his valuation of these assets was not based upon a forced sale or a 
sale by a bankruptcy trustee, as would be the case if Roberta pursued him, obtained a 
judgment, and then attempted execution. He informed the Court that the only offer he 
had received for the Council property was in the sum of $900,000.00. He informed the 
Court that he had not received any offer for his Preston property and that the 
depreciated value of his farm equipment was minimal. Having first hand knowledge of 
the purchase price of both the Preston and Council property (Exhibits 111 and 110), 
first hand knowledge of the nature of the remaining farm machinery, first hand 
knowledge of the claims both liquidated, as well as unliquidated, being made against 
William Shore by his creditors (even assuming the IRS claim is only $94,000 as 
opposed to $270,000.00 which William Shore believed), it is easy to understand how 
Roberta believes that William Shore has an overwhelmingly negative net worth which 
justifies her decision not to pursue him by way of a third party complaint. 
Bokides questions why Roberta would not foreclose on her mortgage on the 
Council property in order to obtain additional assets for herself. If she did this (she has 
a first mortgage on the Council property in the sum of $1,300,000.00) then she would 
subject herself to execution by McCormick for which it would place her in a position of 
satisfying McCormick's judgment with little or no chance of recourse. The suggestion 
therefore that she foreclose on her mortgage is unreasonable. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a reasonable person, such as Roberta, could easily 
conclude as an economic proposition pursuing William Shore makes no sense. there is 
also a legal impediment to her pursuing William Shore that must be considered. It is 
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true that the divorce decree between William Shore and Roberta requires him to 
indemnify and hold her harmless from "all indebtedness related to the closely held 
corporation, Bear River Equipment, Inc., including, but not limited to, any claims or 
litigation against the parties arising out of the business operated by Bear River 
Equipment, Inc. including attorney's fees and costs." However, as is crystal clear from 
the language of the original Complaint, the claim against Roberta by McCormick in this 
case is based upon her "personal guarantee", not upon an obligation arising from the 
conduct of Bear River Equipment's business. If she had not signed the personal 
guarantee, there would be no claim against Roberta by McCormick as a result of the 
operation of Bear River Equipment's business. Roberta was nothing more than a 
shareholder and officer in Bear River Equipment. Bokides presented absolutely no 
evidence that she, as a shareholder, could be held responsible for Bear River debts. 
McCormick itself did not sue Roberta based upon her status as a shareholder, but 
based only on her status as "personal guarantor." As such, Bokides is not in a position 
to provide assurances that even if Roberta were to have attempted to file a third party 
complaint against William Shore, it would not have been dismissed based on lack of 
standing. 
At the end of Bokides' testimony, he was asked whether or not he considered 
filing a third party complaint against William Shore himself. He stated he thought about 
it, but didn't do it. It seems as though Bokides didn't feel it was worth pursuing William 
Shore on his own behalf, but instead wants to chastise his victim, Roberta, for not doing 
what he himself chose not to do. This position is, at best, disingenuous. 
Finally, if Bokides thinks that it would be a benefit to pursue William Shore in 
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order to mitigate the damages that he has caused by his negligence, then why doesn't 
Bokides simply purchase the judgment McCormick has against Bill Shore from 
McCormick and then execute against William Shore. The answer is obvious. Bokides 
has not done this, nor will he do this, because he doesn't want to be placed in a 
position of throwing good money after bad, but would rather have Roberta engage in 
this speculative venture to save him money. 
CONCLUSION 
Bokides was negligent in not getting Roberta removed from her obligations under 
her personal guarantees to Agricredit and McCormick. As a result of his negligence, 
Roberta has been damaged in the sum of $342,417.42, together with interest thereon, 
and the costs and attorney's fees she has incurred in both defending herself in the 
underlying case and pursuing the Third-Party Complaint. Based on the facts and 
circumstances of this case, she has not failed to mitigate her damages. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2010. ' / 
RINGERT LAW efHARTER 
f 
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COMES NOW Third Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore (hereinafter"Roberta '' ), by and 
through her attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby submits this Post -Trial 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law for the court trial held on August 24, 2010. 
I. FINDI~GS OF FACT 
A. Liability. 
(The first eight (8) findings of fact are from the Court's prior Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment dated July 29. 2010). 
1. McCormick International USA Inc. (McCormick) is a manufacturer of farm 
equipment. In order to market its equipment, McCormick establishes retail distributor/dealerships 
\vith local. but independently owned dealers. In 2005. a dealership with Bear River Equipment, Inc. 
( Bear River) was created for the retail sale of McCormick tractors and other farm equipment. 
7 In order to finance the acquisition of its inventory from McCormick, Bear River 
entered into agreements with Agricredit which were executed by William Shore (William) and 
Roberta on behalf of Bear River. Bear River executed an "Inventory Security Agreement" and a 
'·Retail Financing Agreement·· with Agricredit on March 22. 2005. As part of the Inventory Security 
Agreement, Bear River granted to Agricredit a limited pO\ver of attorney which provided Agricredit 
with authority to execute, on behalf of Bear River, certain documents in the normal course of 
business, including "Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements." As Bear River ordered farm 
equipment from McCormick, the equipment would be financed or floored through Agricredit. 
Wholesale Financing Agreements would be executed by Bear River through the use of the limited 
power of attorney. Once the equipment was sold to the customer, the proceeds of the sale \Vere to 
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be placed in a trust account, separate and apart from Bear River's other funds. 
3. On March 22, 2005, William and Roberta each separately executed personal 
guarantees in which they unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear 
River to Agricredit. 
4. In July and August of 2007 an audit revealed that Bear River had been selling 
equipment financed through Agricredit, receiving proceeds from the sales but failing to apply said 
proceeds to its obligation to Agricredit or to place said monies in a trust account as required by the 
agreements with Agricredit. 
5. McCormick and Agricredit had entered into an agreement wherein McCormick 
agreed to pay Agricredit for the amounts financed to McCormick's dealers if Agricredit was unable 
to collect monies it had paid to dealers for the purchase or flooring of McCormick equipment. By 
assignment dated March 14,2008, Agricredit transfe1Ted to McCormick all of its right title and 
interest to the obligation owed by Bear River to Agricredit. The personal guarantees referenced in 
paragraph 3 were part of the all-inclusive rights assigned to McCormick. 
6. The Guaranty signed by Roberta contained the following provision: 
And that this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the 
liabilities which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC shall 
have received at its Head Office, written notice from the Guarantor 
or the executor, administrators, successors or assigns of the 
Guarantor, to make no further advances on the security of this 
guaranty. 
7. On August 29, 2008 McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as William and 
Roberta in their individual capacities. McCormick moved for summary judgment on May 20,2010. 
McCormick's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted June 10, 2010. See Minute Entry and 
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Order dated June 10,2010. Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta on June 
29. 2010 in the sum of $319,977.98. See Judgment and Order against Bear River Equipment, Inc., 
William R. Shore and Roberta Shore. 
8. The Judgment related to five (5) tractors and three (3) loaders. The proceeds from 
the sale of the equipment were not paid over to Agricredit as required by the Agreements between 
Bear River and Agricredit. The Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements for each of these 
items of equipment are listed and identified in the Affidavit of Kevin Peters and are summarized as 
follows: 
Serial No. Model No. Date Financed 
JJE2026767 MCl 15 Tractor 10/23/06 
JJE3337250 MTX 13 5 Tractor 12/21/06 
JJE3337193 MTX 120 Tractor 12/21/06 
7183970 MCQLl 45 Loader 12/21/06 
JJE2059356 CX105 Tractor 1 /04/07 
JJE2058843 CX85 Tractor 3/15007 
7217799 MCQLl 65 Loader 5/29/07 
7217796 MCQL165 Loader 5/29/07 
See Affidavit of Kevin Peters and Exhibit C through G. 
9. On August 12, 2010, attorney fees and costs were awarded and an Amended 
Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta in the amount of $342,417.42. See 
Amended Judgment. 
10. In March of 2006, Roberta engaged the services of Bokides to represent her in a 
divorce proceeding in Washington County, Idaho, Shore v. Shore Case No. CV 2006-000368. 
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Roberta advised Bokides of the above-referenced personal guarantee and Bokides agreed to notify, 
in writing, Agricredit that Roberta would no longer be a guarantor for the obligations of Bear 
River Equipment, Inc. While there has been some dispute around this issue prior to trial, it was 
clear at trial that even Bokides acknowledged that Roberta asked him to send the letters prior to 
~fay of 2006. 
11. The evidence is undisputed that Bokides did not send the letters he promised to send 
to Agricredit revoking Roberta's personal guarantee. Bokides did not contact McCormick or 
Agricredit to determine if removing Roberta's personal guarantee would negatively impact Bear 
River Equipment. Inc. 's ability to obtain financing in the future. Further, Bokides did not dispute 
that had he sent the letters Roberta would not be a party to this action, McCormick/ Agri-Credit 
would not have obtained the above-referenced Judgment against her, and Roberta would not have 
incurred costs and expenses in defending the underlying claims. 
B. Mitigation of Damages. 
12. Bokides suggests that Roberta failed to mitigate her damages by failing to bring a 
cause of action against William Shore. At the time the cause of action was brought against 
Roberta, she met with attorney James G. Reid to discuss her options. She was advised of a 
potential conflict and a waiver of that conflict was obtained from both Roberta and William. 
Roberta independently determined not to make a claim against William based upon her personal 
knowledge of his assets, liabilities, including pending actions, and net worth. 
13. Roberta, having been married to William, was aware of the assets, liabilities, 
judgments and pending lawsuits of William. It is undisputed that Roberta was also aware of those 
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same assets, liabilities, judgments and pending lawsuits after the divorce. In fact, Roberta was 
a party to some of the lawsuits and continues to have a security interest in some of the assets of 
William. 
14. The Divorce Decree (Exhibit 103), does not specifically state that William will 
indemnify Roberta for her obligations pursuant to her personal guarantees. The Divorce Decree 
provides at paragraph VI that William will indemnify Roberta for "indebtedness related to the 
closely held corporation Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc." 
15. As to William's assets, it is undisputed that William has a negative net worth and 
William may have to file bankruptcy at some point in the future. The Financial Statement dated 
February 26. 2010 (Exhibit 113) does not include the above-mentioned Judgment of 
McCormick/ Agri-Credit. William's testimony was that the value of the assets listed on the 
Financial Statement if sold pursuant to executions would be significantly less than the amounts 
listed. There was a suggestion at trial that William had offered to settle the suit with McCormick 
for $100.000.00 but the undisputed testimony was that William would have to borrow the money 
to accomplish a settlement. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Roberta requested and Bokides agreed to notify Agricredit in writing on Roberta's 
behalf that Roberta would no longer guarantee Bear River Equipment, Inc. 's obligations. But for 
Bokides' failure to notify Agricredit of Roberta's withdrawal as guarantor, McCormick would not 
have obtained a judgment against Roberta in the amount of $342,417.42, together with interest 
from the date of the judgment. As a result of Bokides' negligence in notifying Agricredit of 
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Roberta's withdrawal as guarantor, Bokides is required to indemnify and hold harmless Roberta 
from the judgment against her by McCormick, together with all costs and expenses in the 
underlying action incurred by McCormick. 
2. In violation of the Court's Scheduling Order dated April 9, 2010, Bokides filed, on 
the day of trial. a Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15, to amend his answer to assert the affirmative 
defense of failure to mitigate. The assertion of failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative 
defense which, under I.R.C.P. 8(c), a party must set forth in his or her pleading in response to 
the other·s party pleading. See Taylor v. Browning. 129 Idaho 483, 927 P.2d 873 (1996). In 
Taylor v. Brmvning the party seeking to amend its pleading did so by way of a motion to have the 
pleadings conform to the evidence relating to mitigation which was not objected to at trial. In this 
case. Roberta specifically did not waive her objection to allowing the pleadings to be amended, 
which is a different situation than that in Taylor v. Browning. Roberta has consistently maintained 
her position that mitigation in this case is not a factual issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that she 
impliedly consented to allowing proof to be presented on this issue. As such, the Court must deny 
Bokides' Motion to amend his answer to assert a claim for failure to mitigate. 
3. In the alternative, in the event that the Court allows Bokides to amend his answer 
and assert the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages, Roberta requests the following 
conclusion of law: any claim Roberta would have against William would be based upon contract 
while her claim against Bokides stems from negligence. Bokides has suggested that Roberta must 
pursue William before she can bring an action against him. While the reasonableness of one· s 
actions is at issue on a claim of failure to mitigate, one cannot be required as a matter of law to 
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bring a separate lawsuit against a separate party. This is not a situation of a compulsory 
counterclaim or joint tortfeasor: there is no compulsory requirement to be found in Idaho law. 
If this were the case then the contrary argument would also be applicable. William could argue 
that Roberta could not pursue him until she ·'mitigates'' her damages and first pursues Bokides. 
The road that Bokides is asking the Court to go down is endless and could lead to second guessing 
any plaintiffs decisions to sue or not sue multiple potential defendants and plaintiff's decisions to 
settle when there are multiple potential defendants. 
The other problem with Bokides' suggestion is that it puts the trier of fact in a position of 
second guessing her decision as to the merits of any cause of action she may have against William 
and whether William is judgment proof. In this case, the Divorce Decree provides that William 
will indemnify Roberta for ·· All indebtedness related to the closely held corporation Bear River 
Farm Equipment, Inc .. including. but not limited to, any claims or litigation arising out of the 
business operated by Bear River Farm Equipment. Inc." Roberta was sued by McCormick on 
her personal guaranty and the undisputed evidence is that the indemnity provision in the Divorce 
Decree only applies to business indebtedness and not indebtedness under a personal guaranty. 
Because there are contested factual and legal issues relating to William's obligations to indemnify 
Roberta. it is inappropriate for the trier of fact to attempt to resolve those issues under the guise 
of an affirmative defense for failure to mitigate. It is inappropriate for this case to turn from a 
negligence/malpractice action into an indictment of Roberta's decisions regarding her ability to 
fund a separate lawsuit against William, and her conclusions as to William's assets. liabilities and 
financial capability of paying a judgment. In fact. when Bokides himself was asked why he did 
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not pursue William. he testified that it was discussed with his counsel but that he did not have a 
reason for not doing so. Bokides himself could have just as easily brought an action against 
William under a third party or other type of claim and he chose not to do so. The bottom line is 
that as a matter of law, the trier of fact should not be asked to resolved the merits of Roberta's 
claims against William, second guess the decisions of Roberta, and second guess the costs and 
benefits of attempting to collect a judgment against William. 
4. Finally. in the alternative if the Court is inclined to view the evidence as to 
mitigation of damages. Roberta requests the following conclusion of law: Mitigation of damages 
is defined by IDJI2d 9.14 as follows: ''Any person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary 
care to minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to 
exercise such care cannot be recovered." Idaho courts have consistently held that the burden of 
proof lies with the party asserting the affirmative defense. More specifically, the burden of proof 
as to mitigation of damages is on the party causing the alleged damages, Bokides in this instance. 
See Davis v. First Interstate Bank, 115 Idaho 169. 765 P.2d 680 (1988); Eliopulos v. Kondo 
Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,643 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1982). Thus. the burden is on Bokides to 
prove that Roberta did not exercise reasonable care to mitigate her damages. 
5. Bokides has not met his burden of proving that Roberta failed to exercise 
reasonable care to mitigate her damages. While Bokides would like to disregard his own 
obligations and his own right to pursue William, his ··Monday Morning Quarterbacking" does 
not meet his burden. First, there is a reasonable question as to whether Roberta has a valid claim 
against William based upon the Divorce Decree failing to clearly require indemnification for 
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claims based on her personal guarantee. It was reasonable for Roberta to conclude that such an 
action was not guaranteed and may ultimately only cost her more money. Second, it was 
reasonable for Roberta to question whether, even if she was successful in obtaining a judgment 
against William, she would be able to collect on said judgment. Roberta was aware of the 
financial condition of William, aware of his negative net worth and the pending lawsuits and 
judgments against William. It was not unreasonable for Roberta to decide not to incur additional 
expenses and legal costs to pursue William based upon her personal knowledge of his financial 
condition. 
6. Based upon the evidence presented at trial and applying the applicable law, the 
Court concludes that Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore is entitled to Judgment against Third-
Party Defendant in the sum of $342.417.42. together with interest thereon at the legal rate until 
paid in full, together with any sums due McCormick pursuant to the Judgment in the underlying 
case. The Court further concludes that Roberta Shore is the prevailing party. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2010. 
RINGERT L~;J CHARTERED 
I 
"t!:J ' i I / 
~/ 
By L __ e-/4 
JamesG.ei 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
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ROBERTA SHORE, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third-Party Defendant, 
COMES NOW the third-party defendant, Nicholas Bokides, by and through 
undersigned counsel, and hereby submits Third-Party Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. William R. Shore ("Bill") married Roberta Shore ("Roberta") in 1991. 
Both Bill and Roberta had been married on previous occasions. Bill and Roberta had no children 
during their marriage. 
2. Bill and Roberta acquired Bear River Equipment, Inc. ("Bear River") 
during the course of their marriage. Bear River sold farm equipment and machinery, including 
machinery and products manufactured by McCormick International USA, Inc. ("McCormick"). 
3. In order to finance its inventory from McCormick, Bear River entered into 
agreements with Agri-Credit which were executed by Bill and Roberta on behalf of Bear River. 
4. On March 22, 2005, Bill and Roberta executed personal guarantees 
wherein they unconditionally guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear River to Agri-Credit. 
5. The guarantee signed by Bill and Roberta contained a provision, which 
stated in pertinent part: 
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And that this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the 
liabilities which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC 
shall have received at its Head Office, written notice from the 
guarantor or the executor, administrators, successors or assigns of 
the Guarantor, to make no further advances on the security of this 
guarantee. 
6. In or about July or August 2007, an audit performed by McCormick and 
Agri-Credit revealed that Bear River had been selling equipment financed through Agri-Credit, 
receiving proceeds from the sales, but failing to apply said proceeds to Agri-Credit as required 
by the agreements with Agri-Credit. 
7. On August 29, 2008, McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as 
Bill and Roberta Shore in their individual capacities. The complaint alleged that Bear River 
failed to pay McCormick the sum of $273,080.60 in principal, together with accruing 
prejudgment interest at the legal rate. See McCormick v. Bear River, Complaint,~ 14. 
8. McCormick moved for summary judgment on May 20, 2010. This motion 
was granted on June 10, 2010, and thereafter, judgment was entered against Bear River, Bill and 
Roberta Shore on June 29, 2010, for the sum of $319,977.98. Thereafter, an amended judgment 
was entered which included attorney fees that had been incurred, on August 12, 2010, for the 
total amount of $342,417.42. 
9. The initial judgment related to five tractors and three loaders. The 
proceeds from the sale of the equipment were not paid to Agri-Credit as required by the 
agreements between Bear River and Agri-Credit. Among the items included, was a tractor, 
model number NCl 15, which was financed on October 23, 2006. 
10. All of the remaining items of equipment were financed on or after 
December 21, 2006. 
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11. In or about March 2006, Bill and Roberta decided to terminate their 
mamage. Roberta retained Nicholas Bokides ("Bokides") to represent her interest in the divorce 
proceeding. 
12. As part of the divorce, Roberta wanted to completely extricate herself 
from any involvement with Bear River. To accomplish this, Roberta and Bill agreed that all 
ownership of the company would be given to Bill, and Bill would be responsible for any and all 
liabilities from the company. 
13. Roberta asked Bokides to remove her from the guarantees. Roberta and 
Bokides did not discuss a specific date or timeline as to when written notice terminating the 
guarantees would be sent to Agri-Credit. 
14. Bokides advised Roberta that all debts incurred up to the time of the 
divorce decree were community debts and that until the decree was entered, he would not take 
any action to cancel her guarantees. 
15. The divorce decree was entered into on November 16, 2006. Bokides did 
not send written notice terminating the guarantees following entry of the decree. 
16. Under Paragraph IV of the decree, the parties agreed that Bill would retain 
possession of a ranch/farm property located in Adams County, Council, Idaho (hereinafter, the 
"Council Ranch"). Under the decree, Bill was to market the property without the assistance of a 
real tor up until March 31, 2007. Upon the sale of the property, Roberta would receive 
$1,300,000 out of the net proceeds, with the balance of the proceeds to go to Bill. 
17. In the event that Bill failed to sell the property by March 31, 2007, Bill 
was required to list the property with a realtor, and "actively market the property in good faith." 
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18. Bill was to pay Roberta the sum of $1,000 per month beginning 
March 1, 2007, and continue until the property was sold and Roberta received the $1,300,000 out 
of the net proceeds. In the event the property was not sold before March 1, 2009, the plaintiff 
was to be paid 5% annual interest on the $1,300,000. 
19. Under Paragraph VI of the decree, Bill agreed to defend and hold Roberta 
harmless from the following indebtedness: 
All indebtedness relating to operation of the farm property. 
All indebtedness incurred by defendant. 
All indebtedness related to the closely held corporation Bear River 
Farm Equipment, Inc., including, but not limited to, any claims or 
litigation against the parties arising out of the business operated by 
Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc. including attorney fees and 
costs. 
20. After McCormick filed the complaint in August 2008, Roberta discussed 
the complaint with Bill and they both agreed that Bill was responsible for the claims in the 
McCormick complaint under the terms of the decree. 
21. In addition to the decree, Bill and Roberta entered into a second agreement 
in January 2007, relating to a lawsuit filed by Rodney Peterson for conversion of certain farm 
equipment, filed in the Sixth Judicial District in and for the County of Franklin, State ofldaho. 
Under Paragraph 7 of the agreement to indemnify, Bill had the right to retain counsel for Roberta 
and control the defense of the claims. 
22. In or about August 2008, McCormick sent a demand letter to Roberta 
relative to the guarantee she had signed with Agri-Credit. This is the first time Roberta learned 
that Bokides had failed to send written notice terminating her from the Agri-Credit guarantees. 
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23. Bill had retained James G. Reid, of Ringert Law, Chartered, to represent 
him in several matters arising from the problems with Bear River. Bill also retained Mr. Reid 
and his firm to represent him in the McCormick case. Bill and Roberta agreed that Mr. Reid 
would also represent Roberta in the McCormick case. 
24. Roberta believed that Bill would resolve and settle the case with 
McCormick at the time it was filed. Roberta discussed the fact that Mr. Reid would be 
representing her. They both assumed that Bill would settle the claims with McCormick and 
therefore, it would be appropriate for Mr. Reid to represent them both, in order to minimize any 
expenses that Roberta would incur. 
25. At some point during the litigation, McCormick offered to settle its claims 
with Bill for $200,000. Bill had offered $100,000, but this amount was rejected by McCormick. 
26. Thereafter, it became apparent to Roberta and Bokides, that Bill was not 
going to settle the claims with McCormick. At that point, Bokides advised Roberta that she 
needed to retain separate counsel, and put pressure on Bill to settle with McCormick. Bokides 
recommended that Roberta speak with Stan Welsh in Boise, Idaho, because he was a recognized 
and aggressive attorney in the divorce field. 
27. Even though Roberta was aware that Bokides had failed to send written 
notice terminating the guarantees, she did not want to file a lawsuit against Bokides, because she 
recognized the claims were Bill's responsibility. Eventually, Roberta's attorney advised her that 
in order to protect her interests, she would need to file a lawsuit against Bokides, even though 
that was the last thing that she wanted to do. She followed her attorney's advise, and filed the 
third-party complaint against Bokides in July 2009. 
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28. Roberta paid Mr. Reid's firm approximately $15,000 in attorney fees as of 
January 2010, in connection with the McCormick case. Roberta did not ask or demand that Bill 
pay the attorney fees, even though he was obligated to do so under the express terms of the 
decree. 
29. Roberta did not tender the defense of the McCormick case to Bill. 
Roberta did not demand that Bill defend, indemnify and hold her harmless from the claims in the 
McCormick case. 
30. Roberta did not file a cross-claim against Bill, in an effort to seek a 
judgment declaring that he was responsible for the McCormick claims under the decree, in the 
event that McCormick succeeded in obtaining a judgment against her. Roberta did not submit 
any written discovery to Bill, or take any depositions of Bill or anyone who might have 
knowledge of the nature and extent of Bill's assets and net worth. 
31. Roberta did not pursue her rights under the decree, in an effort to bring 
pressure on Bill to market the property in good faith, but instead allowed him to continue to 
market the property for $6.2 million up until November or December 2009. 
32. In March 2008, Bill and Roberta agreed to amend the decree, by entering 
an amended judgment that gave her a mortgage in the property for $1.3 million dollars. At the 
same time, Bill and Roberta agreed to remove any requirement that Bill actively market the 
property in good faith, thereby giving Bill the right to retain the property and control if and when 
he would sell it, and also to determine the price. 
33. Roberta did not attempt to foreclose on her mortgage at any time after 
McCormick filed its complaint. If Roberta had foreclosed, she would have been able to satisfy 
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her mortgage for $1.3 million, and pay McCormick's claims, assuming the property could have 
been sold for a minimum of $1.6 million in August 2008. 
34. At the time of the divorce in November 2006, Roberta and Bill had a 
combined net worth of $5,021,563, as reflected by the property schedule prepared by Bokides 
during the divorce. Of that amount, Bill received $2,991,139 worth of property and assets from 
the divorce, and Roberta received $2,284,000, including the $1.3 million dollars proceeds from 
the sale of the Council Ranch. 
35. The $5 million dollar figure was based upon an assumed value for the 
Council Ranch of $3,165,000, as reflected in the Broker's Opinion prepared by Creed Noah, 
dated September 21, 2006. 
36. Creed Noah assigned a value of $372,000 to the "unfinished custom 
home" on the Council Ranch, and stated that that value was based on the home's "current 
unfinished condition," and that there was a "great deal more expense required to complete this 
building in conformance with the current plan." 
37. After November 2006, and prior to the time of trial, Bill spent over 
$100,000 on improvements to the home. Roberta did not retain any experts to appraise the value 
of the Council Ranch as of August 2008, or at any time up to and including the trial. 
38. Sometime in 2007, Bill received an offer on the property for $5 million 
dollars however, upon further investigation, the offer turned out to be a sham. 
39. In February 2010, Bill prepared a financial statement, in response to 
discovery requests propounded by Bokides. As of February 2010, Bill estimated that his net 
worth, after subtracting all current liabilities from his total assets, was $230,920. Bill's net worth 
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in February 2010, would have been sufficient to pay the $200,000 that McCormick had offered 
to settle for. 
40. In February 2010, Bill claimed that the value of the Council Ranch had 
declined from $3.16 million to $1,625,000. Bill testified that the value of the property had 
declined significantly since the divorce. Bill did not offer an opinion as to the fair market value 
of the property as of August 2008, when McCormick filed its complaint, but both Bill and 
Roberta agreed the property was worth much more in August 2008, than in February 2010, a fact 
that was borne out by Bill's continuing efforts to market the property for $6.2 million. 
41. Bill testified at trial that the fair market value of the property as of the time 
of trial, was approximately $900,000, based on an offer for that amount he had received within 
the last month. 
42. Both Bill and Roberta were aware that the amount of damages 
McCormick was seeking in the complaint filed in August 2008, was accruing interest and that 
therefore, their potential liability and exposure would continue to increase over time. Similarly, 
both Bill and Roberta were cognizant of the fact that the value of the Council Ranch property 
was diminishing over time. 
43. Both Bill and Roberta testified that following the divorce, and the ensuing 
financial problems with Bear River, Bill had exhausted a significant portion of his assets paying 
claims and judgments filed against Bear River. 
44. In addition to the Council Ranch, Bill also owned real property in Preston, 
Idaho, upon which Bear River's facility was located. Bill estimated the fair market value of this 
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property as $220,000 in February 2010. In the property schedules prepared by Bokides in 
connection with the divorce, the Preston real estate was valued at $300,000. 
4 5. On his financial statement in February 2010, Bill lists his machinery and 
equipment values at $142,000. At the time of the divorce, the machinery and equipment were 
listed at $160,000 with Roberta's comments being, that an "appraisal was needed," because over 
$160,000 had been invested in the equipment by Bill and Roberta. 
46. With respect to the liabilities listed on the February 2010 financial 
statement, he lists that he was personally liable for payroll taxes to the IRS in the amount of 
$272,000. Bill testified at trial that he assumed, that he was personally liable for this entire 
amount. 
47. The May 17, 2010 letter from the IRS to Bill denying his appeal states that 
Bill is only personally liable for $94,669 in trust fund taxes. This figure is supported by two (2) 
separate forms, Form 2751, which assert liabilities of $64,364.74 and $30,303.41. These 
documents were attached to the May 17, 2010 letter. 
48. The December 12, 2007 letter from the IRS that is addressed to Bear River 
sets forth the outstanding balance for payroll taxes in the amount of $176,888.57, which is the 
amount assessed against the corporation, not against Bill. Under the Trust Fund Recovery Act, 
Bill is only personally liable for the $94,669 and accordingly, Bill had overstated his liability by 
$176,888.57. 
49. By adding the $177,000 to his admitted net worth of $230,000 in the 
February 2010 financial statement, Bill had $400,000 in net worth, which would have been more 
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than enough to satisfy the entire amount of the amended McCormick judgment, and would have 
been more than enough to pay the $200,000, that McCormick was willing to settle its claims for. 
50. In his financial statement of February 2010, Bill also lists a liability in the 
amount of $20,900 for Idaho payroll taxes. Although Bill may be liable pursuant to 
LC. §63-378, the August 25, 2007 notice of deficiency shows an assessment of $12,209.07, not 
the $20,900 as reported by Bill on his financial statement. Again, Bill has overstated this 
liability by $8,690.93. 
51. Bill also lists on his is financial statement a liability in the form of a claim 
for attorney fees by the law firm Merrill and Merrill, in the amount of $69,700. This amount was 
incurred by the firm in representing Bill in one of his lawsuits with Mr. Peterson. There is no 
evidence that Merrill and Merrill has made any active attempts to collect on this amount, other 
than sending Bill monthly invoices. Bill does not believe this is a valid debt, or at a minimum, 
that he has defenses to this potential debt based upon incompetence of representation. 
52. In addition, Bill lists as a liability a loan to his aunt, Elminor Harper for 
$62,500 which he borrowed on order to pay one of his claims. Bill's aunt is in her 90's and has 
made no active attempts to execute on the judgment or accelerate the debt. Bill is voluntarily 
paying his aunt $500 a month. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Roberta and Bokides agreed that Bokides would notify Agri-Credit in 
writing to remove Roberta from the guarantees. No specific timeframe was discussed or agreed 
upon as to when the notices would be sent. Bokdies felt there were prudent reasons not to send 
the notices before the divorce was final and explained bis reasons to Roberta. 
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2. Bokides did not send written notice to Agri-Credit following the divorce 
in November 2006. Even if he would have, Roberta would still be liable for the equipment 
provided to Bear River in October 2006. 
3. Because of Bokdies' failure to send written notice, Roberta has a potential 
liability to McCormick for the amount in the amended judgment, in the event that McCormick 
does not execute on its judgment and satisfy its claim's against Bill. Alternatively, Roberta has a 
potential liability to McCormick, if McCormick is only successful in satisfying part of its 
judgment by executing on Bill's assets. 
4. Bill has an obligation to defend, indemnify and hold Roberta harmless 
from any and all debts arising from the operation of Bear River under the express terms of the 
decree. The claims in the McCormick complaint that gave rise to that amended judgment, arise 
from the operation of Bear River and accordingly, Bill has a legal duty to indemnify Roberta 
from the claims in the complaint. 
5. Roberta possesses a valid legal claim against Bill for indemnification 
under the terms of the decree. The fact that Roberta has not elected to file a claim, does not 
mean that she does not possess the claim. 
6. Roberta has an obligation to take reasonable steps to mitigate her actual or 
potential damages she may suffer that stern from Bokides failure to send written notices to 
Agri-Credit. Once Roberta became aware of any actual or potential damages, she was under a 
legal obligation to take prompt and reasonable steps to mitigate her potential damages. The law 
does not permit Roberta to merely sit back and passively allow herself to be subjected to losses. 
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7. Roberta had a duty to take reasonable steps to either eliminate or, at a 
minimum, take steps to reduce the damages she might suffer. The fact that Bill may not have 
liquid assets or cash available to satisfy the entire amount of the McCormick judgment, is not the 
issue. The question is whether Bill had any assets available to satisfy all, or even part of the 
judgment. 
8. Roberta's obligation to mitigate damages arose when she became aware of 
Bokides negligence. Roberta first became aware of Bokides negligence when McCormick sent 
its demand letter to her and in any event, no later than August 2008, when McCormick filed its 
complaint. Therefore, if Bill had any assets to either pay in its entirety, or satisfy a part of the 
claims, Roberta was required to go after those assets. 
9. James Reid and his firm represented Bill in the McCormick case. 
Mr. Reid owed fiduciary obligations of competence, loyalty and confidentiality to Bill. 
Simultaneously, Mr. Reid represented Roberta in the same litigation. Mr. Reid and his firm 
owed the same fiduciary obligations of competence, loyalty and confidentiality to Roberta. 
10. Given Bill's unequivocal duty to defend and indemnify Roberta as 
contained in the decree, Bill's financial interest was inconsistent with Roberta's interest. Given 
Roberta's duty to seek indemnification, her interests were clearly at loggerheads with Bill. 
11. Even though Roberta had an unequivocal duty to mitigate her damages 
and seek recovery against Bill, Mr. Reid could not pursue any claims against Bill because, under 
Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Subparagraph (b)(3), a lawyer cannot agree 
to represent a client if the representation involves "the assertion of a claim by one client against 
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another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a 
tribunal." Such a conflict cannot be waived; it is a non-consentable conflict. 
12. Mr. Reid was therefore precluded from asserting any claims against Bill 
on behalf of Roberta in the McCormick case. As a matter oflaw, Roberta could not discharge 
her duty to mitigate her damages by retaining the same lawyer that represented Bill and as a 
consequence, her claims against Bokides must be dismissed. 
13. Since Roberta has not suffered any actual damages from the McCormick 
case at this point in time, and McCormick could still execute and satisfy its entire judgment 
against Bill, Roberta may never suffer any damages. Moreover, the statute oflimitations on 
Roberta's claim for indemnification against Bill has not even began to run. Therefore, if 
McCormick does not satisfy its judgment against Bill, Roberta can retain independent counsel, 
and bring her claims against Bill. 
14. Roberta's claim that it would have been futile to pursue any claims against 
Bill because he was broke, is invalid, as a matter oflaw. The law does not require that a party 
have liquid assets available to pay a judgment, only that he has some assets available. Moreover, 
the law does not require that a party have enough assets to satisfy the entire judgment; it is 
sufficient if that party has some assets available to reduce the amount of damages. 
15. The law does not allow the party to merely sit back and allow damages to 
accrue. The law requires a party to take reasonable steps, which includes the obligation to 
expend reasonable amounts of money and attorney fees, in pursuing a claim against another 
party. That is especially true in cases such as the instant case, where another party is primarily 
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obligated to satisfy the debt, as Bill was primarily obligated under the decree, and Roberta was 
only secondarily liable, by virtue ofBokides failure to send written notices to Agri-Credit. 
16. Roberta could have taken reasonable steps to mitigate her damages in 
August 2008, and Bill had sufficient assets in August 2008, to pay the entire amount of the 
McCormick claim, of $275,000. 
17. Even as late as February 2010, Bill estimated his net worth to be 
$230,000. By 2010, Bill estimates that the fair market value of the Council Ranch had 
diminished significantly. Although the property may have declined in value between 
November 2006 and August 2008, to some extent Bill continued to market the property for $6.2 
million. If in fact the property was not worth $6 million, or even close thereto, then Bill was not 
actively marketing the property in good faith, as was his obligation under the express terms of 
the decree. 
18. Roberta could have pursued her right to enforce the terms of the decree 
when Bill failed to actively market the Council Property, by bringing suit and accelerating her 
debt. Thereafter, in March 2008, when Roberta obtained a mortgage on the property, she could 
have foreclosed on her mortgage and satisfied her claims for $1.3 million, and the McCormick 
judgment, if the property would have sold for even $1.6 million. In August 2008, the property 
was worth that amount, since even Bill admits the property was worth $1.6 million in 
February 2010, almost two (2) years later. 
19. Bill was able to pay virtually all of his claims and creditors with the 
exception of McCormick, and exhausted numerous assets in the effort, between November 2006 
and February 2010. Nevertheless, Bill still had $230,000 of net worth in February 2010. 
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Moreover, given Bill's mistaken assumptions about his personal liability to the IRS, Bill actually 
had a net worth closer to $400,000 in February 2010, which amount would have been sufficient 
to satisfy the entire amount claimed by McCormick in its complaint, and/or the amount in the 
amended judgment. 
20. In addition, there are a number of other items in Bill's financial statement 
in February 2010, in which his liabilities were overstated, such as the claims to Merrill and 
Merrill and his aunt. Moreover, Roberta believed that at the time McCormick filed its complaint, 
that Bill had sufficient assets to settle the claims with McCormick, which is why she refrained 
from bringing any suit against Bokides. 
21. Both Bill and Roberta recognized that McCormick's claims continued to 
increase in value over time because of interest and attorney fees, and at the same time Bill was 
spending his assets paying other claims, and the value of the real property was diminishing. As 
such, Roberta understood that her potential damages would actually increase over time. If 
Roberta had acted promptly in an attempt to mitigate, her potential damages would have been 
much less in August 2008 then they are in August 2010. 
22. Roberta did not take any steps to mitigate her damages against Bill which 
included, among other things, hiring independent counsel to represent and defend her; tendering 
the defense of claims to Bill; filing a cross-claim against Bill; and seeking to enforce the terms of 
the decree by either accelerating the debt, or later by foreclosing on her mortgage. Because 
Roberta has taken no steps to minimize her damages, and because she was legally precluded 
from taking any steps to mitigate her damages because her attorney represented Bill, as a matter 
of law, her claims must be dismissed. 
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DATED this 13th day of September, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By 6/W~ 
Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RNER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
individual. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-327 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
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ROBERTA SHORE, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third-Party Defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
While Nick Bokides ("Bokides") admits that he did not provide written notice to 
McCormick and AgriCredit as requested by his client Roberta Shore ("Roberta"), there is a 
dispute as to when the parties agreed Bokides would give notice to these creditors. 
More importantly, Bokides' negligence does not eliminate Roberta's duty to 
mitigate but, in fact, it was Bokides' negligence which created the duty to mitigate. The 
evidence presented shows that Roberta took no steps to mitigate her damages. She relied on 
Bill Shore's ("Bill") attorney to represent her and evaluate her claims against Bill. Within the 
context of that representation, Bill and Roberta's attorney determined that pursuing Bill would be 
fruitless. While Roberta has argued that Bill has no assets, a review of Bill's unsubstantiated 
financial statement shows, that by his own account, he has a positive net worth. A net worth that 
could be used to satisfy McCormick's judgment in whole, or at least in part. Roberta has not 
satisfied her duty to mitigate and her claims against Bokides should therefore be barred. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. ROBERTA SHORE HAS FAILED TO MITIGATE HER DAMAGES AND 
THEREFORE, HER CLAIMS AGAINST BOKIDES MUST BE DENIED 
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT SHE COULD 
HA VE RECOVERED BY SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FROM 
WILLIAM SHORE. 
It is universally recognized by courts and commentators that a party who has been 
injured by the conduct of another, whether in contract or in tort, has an obligation to take 
reasonable steps to mitigate his/her damages. The duty to mitigate, also known as the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences, "provides that a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of a 
defendant is ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by 
reasonable acts .... " 1 The policy underlying the doctrine of avoidable consequences is to 
prevent "persons against whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic 
loss which could be avoided by reasonable efforts."2 
Idaho courts have also specifically held that the doctrine of mitigation of damages 
is applicable to a legal malpractice claim. Thus, in the case of O'Neil v. Vasseur3, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that "if an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the 
client with an alternative remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result 
maybe that the client suffers no loss or a reduced loss as the proximate cause of the attorney's 
negligent conduct."4 
1 U.S. Bank National Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222,228, 999 P.2d 877, 883 (2000). 
2 Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96 Idaho 574,577,532 P.2d 918,919 (1974) 
quoting Wright v. Baumann, 398 P.2d 119 (1965). 
3 118 Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134. 
4 118 at 262, quoting Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2nd 654, 658 (ND 1999).(emphasis 
added). 
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In this case, Roberta Shore could have recovered and still can recover against 
Bill's assets. He is primarily responsible for satisfaction of the judgment under the Divorce 
Decree, notwithstanding Bokides' alleged negligence. Roberta has done exactly what the policy 
underlying the doctrine of avoidable consequences seeks to prevent. Upon the advice of counsel 
for both Bill and her, Roberta has passively stood by, rather than pursuing claims against Bill. 
Since the commencement of this litigation, rather than take any action against Bill, Roberta has 
watched Bill's net worth decrease and his ability to satisfy the claims diminish. 
The case at bar exemplifies the very evils that the doctrine of mitigation was 
designed to prevent, i.e. where a party injured by the conduct of another sits back and passively 
allows damages to be incurred, without taking any steps to eliminate or reduce those damages. 
Roberta has taken absolutely no steps whatsoever, much less any reasonable steps, to attempt to 
force her former husband, Bill, to satisfy part or all of McCormick's claims and judgment. 
Roberta has not met her burden to mitigate her damages. 
A. By failing to retain independent counsel, Roberta Shore was prohibited 
from taking any steps to mitigate her damages, because of a non-
consentable conflict of interest. 
As has previously been submitted to the Court, the Decree of Divorce between 
Bill and Roberta provides that Bill was obligated to indemnify, defend and hold 
Roberta harmless for any and all indebtedness related to Bear River Equipment. While Bill is 
contractually and legally obligated to defend and indemnify Roberta from those very claims, 
Roberta now argues that that it is not certain that she could bring a claim against Bill. This 
argument is refuted by Bill's own acknowledgement that he is responsible for the McCormick 
and AgriCredit liabilities pursuant to the Divorce Decree and further exemplifies the conflict of 
the same attorney representing both Roberta and Bill. 




Upon the filing of the complaint by McCormick against Bill and Roberta in 
August of 2008, Roberta should and could have tendered the defense of the case to her ex-
husband, Bill. Bill would have been required, under the express language of the Divorce Decree, 
to both defend and indemnify Roberta, by paying any costs and legal fees that would have been 
incurred. If Bill would have rejected the tender of defense, then Roberta should and could have 
filed a cross-claim at that point in time, seeking to enforce the indemnification provision of the 
decree in the lawsuit brought by McCormick. 
Rather than making any effort or attempt to force Bill to indemnify and defend 
her, Roberta did the one thing that effectively precluded her from insisting that Bill indemnify 
and defend her; she retained the same law firm that was representing Bill! More importantly, by 
failing to retain independent counsel, Roberta was precluded from making any attempt to 
mitigate her damages. In particular, Rule 1. 7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
governs conflicts of interest, provides in relevant part under sub-section "b" as follows: 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest under Paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one 
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal; .... 
Under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Roberta's law firm could not 
assert a claim against Bill and continue to represent her. Nor could they reasonably evaluate the 
merits of taking such an action against Bill. Such representation would have constituted a non-
consentable conflict. After consulting with Bill's attorney, Roberta determined that rather than 
asserting a claim against Bill and take reasonable steps to mitigate her damages, she should file a 
third-party complaint against her attorney, Nicholas Bokides, alleging that he should be held 
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exclusively responsible for the entire amount of McCormick's judgment against Bill and 
Roberta, because of his failure to submit written notices to McCormick that Roberta would no 
longer be liable on the continuing guarantees. 
It is axiomatic that Roberta's law firm had a duty to zealously represent and 
defend her. Likewise, that firm had the same obligation to vigorously represent and defend Bill. 
Roberta's law firm could not take any steps to seek to enforce the indemnification provisions of 
the divorce decree against Bill, while at the same time representing Bill. Therefore, Roberta has 
focused all of her efforts and resources on shifting responsibility for Bill's debts to McCormick 
on to Bokides, who, is at best, only secondarily liable for damages to Roberta. This is precisely 
the type of conflict that the rules were designed to prevent. 
Bill has a clear, unequivocal obligation to both defend and indemnify Roberta 
from any and all indebtedness from Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc., and has clearly admitted 
this obligation in this case. Given the indemnification provision in the Divorce Decree, 
Roberta's interests are unquestionably aligned directly against Bill. Unfortunately, because 
Roberta and Bill are represented by the same law firm, there has been not even the slightest 
effort to "vigorously develop" the claims against Bill. 
Given the patently obvious conflict of interest, Roberta was precluded from taking 
any steps to mitigate her damages and accordingly, as a matter oflaw, the Court should dismiss 
Roberta's claims against Bokides. 
B. Roberta Shore has taken no steps to mitigate her damages, much less any 
reasonable steps. 
In virtually every case that can be found, in Idaho or anywhere else, the courts 
have stated that a party who has been injured by the actionable conduct of another, must take 




"reasonable steps" or make "reasonable efforts" or "actions" in order to mitigate his/her 
damages. In this case, Roberta has not taken any steps whatsoever to mitigate her damages, 
much less any reasonable ones. Under such circumstances, the Court should rule as a matter of 
law, that Roberta has failed to mitigate her damages and dismiss her claims against Bokides. 
When McCormick filed its complaint against Bear River Equipment, Bill and 
Roberta, the reasonable steps that Roberta should and could have taken include the following: 
1. Hire independent counsel to represent and defend her in the case; 
2. Tender the defense of the claims to Bill, thereby forcing Bill to retain 
separate counsel; 
3. File a cross-claim against Bill; 
4. Sue to enforce the terms of the Divorce Decree, which required Bill to 
defend and indemnify Roberta; 
5. Sue to enforce the terms of the divorce decree, which required Bill to 
make good faith efforts to sell the property to satisfy his debts; 
6. Propound written discovery to Bill to discover the current state of his 
assets; 
7. Take depositions of persons with knowledge of Bill's assets; 
8. Send subpoenas to all institutions or banks that may have knowledge of 
Bill's wealth or assets; 
9. Conduct an asset search to determine assets he may have or may be 
concealing; 
10. Conduct a title search for any and all real property owned by Bill; 
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11. Retain an expert to appraise the current value of the property owned by 
Bill as of the time McCormick filed its complaint; and 
12. File a brief or affidavits in opposition to the summary judgment motion 
filed by McCormick, rather than merely passively allowing judgment to be taken and thereafter 
trying to force Bokides to pay that judgment. 
Because Roberta did not take any steps to mitigate her damages, she clearly has 
not taken reasonable steps to mitigate her damages and therefore, her claims should be 
dismissed. 
C. Roberta Shore is not relieved from her obligation to mitigate damages 
because of her claim that it might have been futile to make such efforts. 
Roberta's excuse for failing to mitigate is that it would have been "futile" to make 
a claim against William Shore, because he allegedly does not have the financial ability to retire 
the debt. If Roberta contends that Bill has no assets whatsoever, or, conversely, whether she 
contends that Bill does not have sufficient assets to satisfy the entire amount of McCormick's 
judgment for approximately $340,000, then her contention is not consistent with the evidence 
presented, as Bill has admitted he has sufficient assets to satisfy at least a portion of the 
judgment. 
On the other hand, if Roberta's claim is that Bill does not have sufficient assets to 
satisfy the judgment in its entirety, and therefore she has no duty to mitigate, her argument is 
contrary to all of the cases and opinions which state a party has a duty to mitigate damages, even 
if the efforts are only successful in reducing the amount of the damages incurred, as opposed to 
eliminating the damages in their entirety. 
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Accordingly, "mitigation" is not generally an affirmative theory ofrecovery. It is 
a vehicle employed by the defendants to show a plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to 
minimize its damages. If the defendant is successful, the court can reduce or even deny the 
damages asserted by the plaintiff . .. 5 
Bokides recognizes that under Idaho law, he has the burden of proving that Robert 
failed to reasonably mitigate her damages. However, once the party asserting the affirmative 
defense has shown that available alternatives existed to the other party which would have 
minimized the damages, the burden shifts back to the other party to prove that there were no 
other reasonable alternatives. Bokides has demonstrated that there were and are other alternative 
sources that from which Roberta could have reduced or even eliminated her damages, i.e. by 
filing a claim against Bill. The burden then shifted to Roberta to prove that this was not a 
reasonable alternative source. Roberta failed to establish that Bill does not have, at a minimum, 
the ability to satisfy part of the judgment. 
Despite Roberta's self-serving claim that it would have been futile to sue her ex-
husband because he was broke, does not relieve her from the obligation of bringing suit, and 
attempting to pursue her claims of indemnification against him. As the Supreme Court has stated 
"the doctrine [ of avoidable consequences] requires reasonable effort to mitigate damages. Thus, 
if reasonable, the efforts need not be successful."6 
5 In Re: JL Korn, 352 Br 228, D Idaho (2006). See also Clark v. Int 'l Harvester Co., 99 
Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784, 805 (1978). 
6 Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, NA, 115 Idaho 169, 171, 765 P.2d 680 (1988), 
citing JP Calamari and J P. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 (2nd Ed., 1977). 
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II. IF ROBERTA SHORE HAD MADE ANY EFFORT TO MITIGATE, SHE 
COULD HAVE ELlMINATED ORAT A MINIMUM, REDUCED HER 
DAMAGES. 
When it became apparent that Roberta did not undertake any efforts to attempt to 
mitigate her damages and hold Bill responsible for McCormick's claims, Bokides undertook 
efforts to conduct discovery to investigate what assets Bill had available to pay the McCormick's 
claims. In connection with the discovery requests propounded by Bokides, Bill prepared a 
financial statement in February 2010, demonstrating, by his own admission, a net worth of 
approximately $230,000, which would have been available to at least partially satisfy 
McCormick's claims. Moreover, Bokides believes the financial statement, which was prepared 
for purposes oflitigation, most likely understated Bill's net worth, and over exaggerated his 
liabilities, thereby skewing his real net worth. For example, Bill owns a ranch property in 
Council, Idaho which, at the time of the divorce, was valued at approximately $3.6 million 
dollars. Additionally, Bill failed to include a lot he owns in Council, Idaho. Bill also 
significantly overstated his liabilities to the IRS and State Tax Commission. 
Roberta testified that Bill was attempting to sell the property in 2007 for 
approximately $6.5 million. If the sale price was even remotely close to the fair market value of 
the property, that value would have been more than adequate to satisfy all of the McCormick's 
claims, and also pay Roberta's lien on the property in the amount of$1.3 million. 
Moreover, McCormick filed the initial lawsuit in August 2008, and therefore, the 
relevant timeframe for determining whether Bill had any assets was in August 2008, and not two 
(2) years later in August 2010, at the time of the trial. If the property has declined in value in the 
last two (2) years then, then the decline further exemplifies Bokides argument that Roberta has 
not taken reasonable steps to mitigate her damages, by filing a timely cross-claim against Bill 
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On the other hand, if Bill was deliberately increasing the price of the property 
well above fair market value, then it is clear that he would not have been acting in good faith in 
an attempt to market the property, as was his obligation under the Divorce Decree. 
III. ROBERTA SHORE IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
AGAINST BOKIDES FROM THE MCCORMICK JUDGMENT, 
BECAUSE MCCORMICK HAS NOT, AND MAY NEVER ENFORCE THE 
JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERTA SHORE. 
As stated in previous briefing by Bokides in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, the law in Idaho makes clear that a party cannot recover damages in a malpractice 
action where there is only a potential for damages. Chicione v. Bignal, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 
1293 (1992). At the time Bokdies filed his motion for summary judgment, McCormick had not 
obtained its judgment. McCormick has since obtained a judgment in June 2010, which judgment 
is entered in favor of McCormick, and against Bear River Equipment, Bill and Roberta. It is 
undisputed that Roberta and Bill are jointly and severally liable on the continuing guarantees to 
McCormick. 
McCormick has the option of pursuing its judgment against either Bill, Roberta, 
or both, to the extent one or the other has insufficient funds to satisfy the entire judgment. If 
McCormick elects to proceed against Bill, and records its judgment against the property owned 
by Bill, which it may, it would be able foreclose on its claims and sell the property, and receive 
full reimbursement for its judgment. If McCormick pursues this option, Roberta will suffer no 
damages. 
Roberta's claim that she suffered damages by way of attorney fees incurred by 
having to defend against McCormick's claims is clearly erroneous. First, if Roberta Shore would 
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have tendered the defense to Bill, he would have been required to defend and indemnify her, 
from any and all claims, including costs and attorney fees. 
Moreover, since the undisputed evidence shows that at least one tractor was sold 
to Bear River in August 2006 and Bokides was not required to send a written notice until 
November 2006, McCormick would have brought suit against Roberta in any event and she 
would still have been required to hire an attorney and incur those costs and fees. Roberta has 
offered no evidence that McCormick would have released her from the guaranty, even ifBokides 
had sent written notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding Bill's absolute and admitted liability, Roberta has not sought to 
enforce the provisions of the Decree of Divorce against Bill, nor taken any other steps to ensure 
that Bill indemnifies her, such as filing a cross-claim against him. Rather, Roberta has only 
sought to pass on any potential damages she may sustain to Bokides. As demonstrated to this 
Court, Roberta has a clear duty to mitigate her damages by seeking enforcement of the Decree of 
Divorce against Bill. 
Roberta's unwillingness to take action against Bill is an attempt to have Bokides 
bear the total liability for the amounts advanced to Bear River while allowing Bill to escape 
liability, and keep his ranch, pursuant to the guaranties and the Decree of Divorce. Roberta has 
passively allowed the party primarily liable for the debt to avoid any responsibility by trying to 
place the blame on Bokides who is, at best, secondarily liable. 
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DATED this 13th day of September, 2010. 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By 6J) u~-
Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides 
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COMES NOW Third Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore (hereinafter"Roberta Shore''), by and 
through her attorneys of record. Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby submits this Post -Trial Reply 
Brief for the court trial held on August 24, 2010. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Third Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides (hereinafter "Bokides") continues to attempt to 
shift the blame to Roberta Shore for the fact that Bokides admittedly failed to send written notice 
terminating the guarantees even though he agreed to do so. Bok ides blames Roberta Shore for not 
incurring additional legal expenses in attempting to force her ex-husband, William Shore (hereinafter 
--Bill Shore"), to satisfy the McCormick judgment, even though pursuing Bill Shore would not have 
been successful based upon Roberta Shore· s undisputed personal knowledge of Bill Shore's financial 
status. If Bokides really believes that Bill Shore has the financial capability to satisfy the 
McCormick judgment, then why has Bokides not pursued a cross claim or other action against Bill 
Shore? The obvious answer is because even though Bokides would like to second guess and play 
··Monday Morning Quarterback'' with Roberta Shore's decisions, Bokides does not want to incur 
additional expenses and attorney fees in pursuing Bill Shore when such efforts would likely be futile. 
Bokides would rather blame the victim, who has done nothing wrong and now has a $342,417.42 
judgment against her, for his negligence. The bottom line remains that Roberta Shore would not 
have a judgment against her, would not have been sued on her personal guarantees and would not 
be involved in this case but for Bokides' negligence. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Undisputed Liability. 
Bokides does not dispute that Roberta Shore asked Bokides to remove her from the 
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guarantees and that he failed to send written notice removing her from the guarantees. Third Party 
Defendant's Findings of Fact, 113. Bokides does not dispute that had he sent the letters Roberta 
Shore would not be a party to this action and McCormick would not have obtained the above-
referenced Judgment against her. Further, Bokides does not dispute that Roberta Shore has paid 
attorney fees in the amount of $15,000.00 "in connection with the McCormick case." Third Party 
Defendant's Finding of Fact, 128. Thus, it is undisputed that Bokides was negligent and but for 
his negligence Roberta Shore would not have been a party, or incurred attorney fees and expenses, 
in connection with the McCormick case, would not have judgment against her. 
The only dispute by Bokides relates to when Roberta Shore asked Bokides to remove her 
from the personal guarantees. However, Bokides' argument that he would not take any action to 
cancel the guarantees until the Divorce Decree was entered is not supported by the evidence 
presented at trial. As this Court will recall, Bokides provided numerous versions of his story prior 
to trial, but at trial he acknowledged that Roberta Shore asked him to send the letters prior to May 
of 2006. Despite Bokides' attempt to change his story again, the undisputed testimony of Roberta 
Shore was that she asked Bokides to send the letters prior to May of 2006, and Bokides not only did 
not dispute said testimony but acknowledged the same. Thus, the evidence is undisputed that but 
for Bokides failure to send the letters cancelling Roberta Shore's personal guarantees, Roberta Shore 
would not have a judgment against her for all eight tractors and/or loaders, even the one financed on 
October 23, 2006. 
B. Mitigation of Damages. 
As set forth in Roberta Shore's prior briefing, the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate 
was not raised in Bokides' pleadings prior to the trial and is not properly before the Court. Further, 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL REPLY BRIEF - 3 
as a matter oflaw, this Court should not be asked to resolve the merits of Roberta Shore's potential 
claim against Bill Shore, and second guess subjective determinations as to whether to proceed with 
such litigation and whether collecting on any claim against Bill Shore would be futile, under the 
guise of failure to mitigate. Without redundantly stating these arguments again, Roberta Shore will 
simply remind the Court of the issues raised in Roberta Shore's opening briefing and point out the 
fact that Bokides has failed to respond to the issues. 
1. Subjective Determinations to Pursue Bill Shore. 
Bokides' entire defense in this case focuses on second guessing Roberta Shore· s decision that 
pursuing her ex-husband would be futile. As the Court is well aware, a decision by a creditor to 
pursue a potential debtor is a subjective decision that involves a number of factors, including, but 
not limited to: 
(a) The merits of the cause of action against the debtor. In this case it is not absolutely 
clear that Roberta Shore would prevail in obtaining a judgment against Bill Shore 
because she was being sued by McCormick on her personal guarantees and arguably 
not on a claim "arising out of the business operated by Bear River Equipment, Inc." 
Thus, the indemnification provisions referenced in paragraph VI of the Divorce 
Decree may not be applicable to the suit by McCormick on Roberta Shore's personal 
guarantees. In addition, Bill Shore may assert other defenses that Roberta Shore 
failed to mitigate her damages by not providing written notice to McCormick 
terminating the guarantees. At the very least, these are defenses that potential 
creditor such as Roberta Shore may reasonably consider in determining whether to 
pursue a potential debtor. 
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(b) Another potential factor a creditor may consider is the cost of pursuing a cause of 
action against the judgment debtor. It is one thing for a well healed, large creditor 
to disregard the risks of not prevailing on a cause of action and incur additional legal 
expenses to pursue a potential debtor. It is another thing for an individual such as 
Roberta Shore, who testified she did not have the financial capability to pursue Bill 
Shore. to disregard the risks and spend more money pursuing a potential debtor. 
( c) As with the co st of pursuing a cause of action, a creditor must also consider the costs 
of attempting to collect in the event the creditor is successful in obtaining a 
judgment. There are costs associated with asset searches, execution or garnishment 
of assets, debtor exams and foreclosure sales to name a few. An individual such as 
Roberta Shore must make a subjective determination as to whether to incur 
additional costs in attempting to collect on a judgment. In this case, Roberta Shore 
testified she did not have the financial capability to pursue such collection efforts. 
(d) Finally, a creditor must make a subjective determination as to whether, even if the 
creditor decides to bring a cause of action, and if that creditor is eventually successful 
in obtain a judgment, whether such judgment is collectible. In this case, it is 
undisputed that Roberta Shore, as the wife of Bill Shore for fifteen years and based 
upon her involvement in the assets and liabilities of Bill Shore, already had personal 
knowledge of the assets and liabilities of Bill Shore and she had determined that it 
would be futile. 
The undisputed testimony is that Roberta Shore was aware of the subjective factors listed 
above, and made the reasonable determination not to pursue Bill Shore prior to retaining Ringert 
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Law in this action. Roberta Shore testified that she was advised that she would need to obtain 
separate counsel if she intended to pursue Bill Shore and that she declined to do so because it would 
be futile. Thus, Bokides' argument that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages as a matter 
oflaw because she retained the same law firm as Bill Shore is completely erroneous and completely 
disregards the undisputed testimony of Roberta Shore. Bokides is asking this Court to second guess 
all of these subjective considerations by Roberta Shore even though Bokides himself has not been 
\Nilling to incur additional fees and expenses in pursuing Bill Shore. 
2. Roberta Shore's Undisputed Personal Knowledge of Bill Shore's Assets and 
Liabilities. 
In this case, Robe11a Shore, who unlike a third party creditor, has direct and personal 
knowledge of the assets and liabilities of Bill Shore because she was married to him for fifteen years, 
she was personally involved in the transactions and/or purchases of many of the assets Bill Shore 
currently holds and she was personally involved in many of the lawsuits and/or judgments currently 
against Bill Shore. Despite such undisputed evidence and testimony of Roberta Shore, Bokides 
suggests that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages because she "could have" taken certain 
steps such as: 
6. Propound written discovery to Bill to discover the current state of his assets; 
7. Take depositions of persons with knowledge of Bill's assets; 
8. Send subpoenas to all institutions or banks that may have knowledge of Bill's wealth 
or assets; 
9. Conduct an asset search to determine assets he may have or may be concealing; 
10. Conduct a title search for any and all real property owned by Bill; 
11. Retain an expert to appraise the current value of the property owned by Bill as of the 
time McCormick filed its complaint. 
Third Party Defendant's Closing Argument, pgs. 7-8. 
Notwithstanding the fact that all of these speculative actions would require Roberta Shore 
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to incur additional expenses and legal fees, Bokides is disregarding the undisputed testimony that 
Roberta Shore already has personal knowledge of Bill Shore's assets. There is no need for Roberta 
Shore to propound discovery to Bill Shore to discover his current state of assets, take depositions, 
subpoena institutions or banks, or conduct an asset or title search because she already has personal 
knowledge of the state of his assets and liabilities. Essentially, Roberta Shore has done all of the 
things Bokides is suggesting she could have done as a result of her own personal knowledge. 
Roberta Shore's undisputed testimony regarding her know ledge of Bill Shore's assets and liabilities 
should not be disregarded by the Court and Bokides' second guessing of the evidence does not meet 
his burden. 
C. Bill Shore's Net Worth. 
Bokides spends a significant amount of effort second guessing and arguing regarding Bill 
Shore's net worth. Bokides goes so far as to engage in rank speculation as to the value of Bill 
Shore's assets and to even speculate that some outstanding liabilities owed to the law firm Merrill 
and Merrill and Bill Shore's aunt will not be executed upon or the loans will not be required to be 
repaid. Bokides has not presented any evidence in the way of appraisals or experts to contradict the 
testimony of Bill Shore as to the value of his assets, and Bokides certainly has not presented any 
testimony from anyone to suggest that the liability owed to Merrill and Merrill or to Eliminor Harper 
will not be collected. Bokides request that this Court also engage in such speculation does not meet 
his burden of proving that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages. 
Bokides also asserts that the value of the Council ranch should be more because Bill Shore 
has attempted to sell the property for more. However, this disregards the undisputed testimony that 
the property was purchased for less than $600,000 and the highest offer ever received for the 
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property was for $900,000. Further, Bill Shore testified that the assets listed on the financial 
statement were ambitious and actual values based upon a forced sale would be much less. 
Bokides suggests that based upon his speculation as to the value of assets and liabilities, Bill 
Shore has a positive net worth. Bokides, however, fails to account for the fact that Bill Shore now 
has a judgment in favor of McCormick in excess of $340,000. Thus, even if one accepts Bokides 
speculation and disregard of the actual testimony and evidence presented at trial, Bill Shore has a 
negative net worth. The bottom line is that second guessing and arguing whether Bill Shore's net 
worth is positive or not does not meet his burden of proving that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate 
her damages. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Bokides concludes by suggesting that Roberta Shore is inappropriately trying to place the 
blame on Bokides. This is an interesting position given that Bokides acknowledges that he 
negligently failed to send written notice terminating the personal guarantees as he agreed to do so 
and that Roberta Shore would not have a $342,000.00 judgment against her but for his negligence. 
Bokides continues to have the audacity to blame his former client for his own negligence and failure 
to act. 
Moreover, Robena Shore was well within her rights to make a subjective determination as 
to the collection of any claim she may have against Bill Shore, and based upon her personal 
knowledge o fhis assets and liabilities, along with the inherent risks, expenses and uncertainties with 
any litigation, it was not unreasonable for her to chose not to pursue such a claim. Bokides' 
invitation that this Court speculate as to the merits of any claim Roberta Shore may have against Bill 
Shore and to speculate as to the net worth of Bill Shore does not meet his burden of proving that 
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Roberta Shore failed to mitigate. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
;;;:Mif:U·i CSJNTY CLE-RK 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN jft 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
IN-C.,. a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
Corporation;. WILLIAM R. SHORE, an. 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
in~vidual, 
Defendants. 




NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2008-327 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This action came before the Court for a one (1) day court trial on.August 24-, 2010. The 
Third-Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore ("Roberta''), was represented by James G: Reid. The Third-
Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides ("Bokides'') was represented by Bradley J. Williams; At the 
conclusion of trial the Court entered a Minute Entry and Order setting forth a post trial briefing 
schedule. Pursuant to this order the parties were instructed to submit post trial arguments along 
with their proposed :findings of fact and conclusions of law. The i;,arties submitted the requested 
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post trial filings and the Court took this matter under advisement. The Court now enters its Findings 
of Fact; Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a). 
SUMMARY OF CASE 
This case involves Roberta's third party claim of attorney malpractice. Roberta a1ieges 
that she retained Bokides to represent her interest in a divorce proceeding involving her then 
husband William Shore (William). Incident to this representation in the divorce proceeding, 
Roberta claims that she instructed Bokides to write letters to Agricredit revoking the personal 
guarantees she had previously given to guarantee the debts of a business owned by her and. 
William, known as Bear River Equipment, Inc. (Bear River). Bokides acknowledges that said 
letters. were never sent to Agricredit or McCormick. This matter proceeded to trial on the issue 
of Bokides directive from his client Roberta to terminate the guarantees- and the particulars of 
that directive, including but not limited to when the directive was given, and the time 
requirements associated with its performance. 
Bokides, at trial, filed Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides Motion to Amend 
Answer. This- motion attached a proposed amended answer and a Memorandum in Support of 
Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend Answer. Roberta objected to 
Bokides' request for leave of court to file an amended answer and the matter was argued to the 
Court, the morning: of trial. The sole basis asserted by Bokides for amending his answer to the 
third party complaint was to assert an affirmative defense alleging that Roberta had failed to 
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mitigate her damages.1 See Tenth Affirmative Defense in Third-Party Defendant Nicholas 
Bold.des' [Proposed] Amended Answer to Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
attached as Exhibit '"A" to Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Am.end Answer. 
Bokides presented evidence at trial in support of his contention that Roberta should. be barred 
from recovering damages from him, arising out of his alleged malpractice, because she failed to 
mitigate her damages. The contention is that Roberta should have sued William under the hold. 
harmless provisions arising out of their divorce. These hold harmless provisions require "pay 
when due" and to "hold. [Roberta) harmless" from the debts of Bear River. 
BOKIDES~ MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER 
The Court will first address Boki.des' motion to amend bis answer.2 Rule 15(a) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the ability, if any, of a party to file amended or 
supplemental pleadings. This rule provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[O}therwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. 
1 The Court took this matter under advisement and advised the parties that it would- issue its ruling on this motion at 
the time it issues its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the trial proceeding. The Court allowed Roberta a 
continuing. objection to the affirmative defense in. question as well as any evidence relating to the mitigation of 
damages issue. The Court also ordered that any presentation of evidence by Roberta concemini; this affirmative 
defense would not be deemed a waiver of her objection, but was merely being offered in defense of the aff1rmative 
defense in the event the Court were to ultimately grant Bokides' motion to amendhls answer. 
2 Although Bokides refers to Rule lS(b) of the Idaho llules of Civil Procedure in his Memorandum in Support of 
Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend Answer, this Court:will only address and analyze this 
motion under I.R.C.P.. 15(a), I.R.C.P. lS'(b) is only applicable when issues are "not raised by the pleadings [but] are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties." In this case Roberta raised her objection to this defense at the 
summary judgment stase and continued to assert her objection at the time of the hearing, on the montlng of trial, and 
during the cours~ of trial by requesting from the Court and receivini; a. continuing objection to evidence and 
testimony related. to mitigation of damages, The objection was specifically that mitigation had never been raised as 
an affirmative defense in. Bokides' initial answer: As such the: Court concludes that lR.C.P. 15(b) has no 
application in this matter. 
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In addressing a motion to amend pleadings, the determination concerning_ whether to allow the 
moving party to am.end its pleading is left to the trial court's. discretion. · Indian Springs v, Indian 
Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 750, 215 P.3d 457, 470 (2009) (Indian Springs), In Indian 
Springs the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the trial court's discretion as follows: 
Id 
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion,. we look at: "(1) 
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion, and 
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.," 
Both I.R.C.P. 15(a) and the case interpreting this rule- establish that trial courts should be 
liberal in granting motions to amend pleadings. This policy of liberality was addressed in Iron 
Eagle v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 13S Idaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 (2003) (Iron Eagle). In Iron 
Eagle the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows: 
A court should liberally grant a motion to amend a complaint, Hayward v, Valley 
Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (2001) .. The purpose 
behind allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on 
their merits and to provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue. Car,· JI 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 
1202 (1999). 
Id at 492. 
In the present case, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion and in applying the liberal 
standard. of freely allowing amendments when justice requires, will allow Bokides' amended 
answer to be filed in this proceeding. The policy of allowing cases to be adjudicated on. their 
merits supports the Court's conclusion in this respect Roberta has been on notice since the 
briefing. and arguments at the summary judgment stage of this litigation that Bokides was 
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asserting the defense of failure to mitigate damage. Bokides' motion for summary judgment and 
supporting memorandum were filed on March 12, 2010. This matter did not proceed to trial until 
August 24, 2010, As such Roberta had notice of this defense at least five months in advance of 
trial. She prepared and defended against this defense at summary judgment. She had adeq_uate 
notice and an opportunity to prepare and defend against this affirmative defense matter for trial 
purposes. m fact, this Co~ in denying the parties' respective motions for summary judgment, 
advised the parties that this was one of the issues that-the Court found th.ere to be genuine issues 
of material fact which necessitated trial. As such, this Court cannot fmd that Roberta is in any 
way prejudiced by Bokides request to amend his answer in order to assert this defense. Further:, 
the Court finds that in keeping with the policy of allowing cases to proceed to trial on the merits 
and the lack of prejudice to Roberta, that justice does require that the Court GRANT Third-Party 
Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend Answer. As such, the Court will DIRECT the 
Clerk of Franklin County Court to file Bokides' Amended Answer to Third-Party Complaint 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Robertaand William were marriedfodifteenyears from 1991 through2006. William 
and Roberta were divorced on November 16, 2006. Duringthe course of their marriage William 
and Roberta acquired and established a business knovm as Bear River Equipment, Inc. ("Bear 
River"), Bear River sold farm equipment and machinery, including machinery and products 
manufactured by McCormick International USA, Inc. (McCormick). 
2. McCormick is a manufacturer of farm equipment. In order to market its equipment, 
McCormick establishes retail distributor/dealerships with local, but independently owned dealers. 
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In 2005, a dealership with Bear River was created for the retail sale ofMcCormick tractors and 
other farm equipment. 
3. In order to finance the acquisition of its inventory from McCormick, Bear River 
entered into agreements with Agricredit Acceptance LLC (Agricredit) which were executed by 
William. and Roberta on behalf of Bear River, Bear River executed an ''Inventory Security 
Agreement" and a "Retail Financing Agreement" with Agricredit on March 22, 2005. As part of 
the Inventory Security Agreement, Bear River granted to Agricredit a limited power of attorney 
which provided Agricredit with the authority to execute, on behalf of Bear River-, certain. 
documents in the normal course of business, including "Wholesale Financing- Requests and 
Agreements." As Bear River ordered farm equipment from McConnick, the equipment would 
be financed or floored through Agricredit Wholesale Financing Agreements would be executed 
by Bear River through the use of the limited power of attorney. Once the equipment was sold to 
the customer, the proceeds of the sale were to be placed in a trust account, separate and apart 
from Bear River's other funds. 
4, On March 22, 2005, William and Roberta each separately executed personal 
guarantees in which they unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear 
River to Agricredit. 
5. The Guaranty signed by Roberta contained the following provision: 
And that this shall. be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the liabilities 
which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC shall have received at its 
Head Office, written notice from the Guarantor or the executor, administrators, 
successors or assigns of the Guarantor, to make no further advances on the 
security of this guaranty. 
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6. In July and August of 2007 an audit revealed that Bear River had been selling 
equipment financed through Agricredit, receiving proceeds from the sales but failing to apply 
said proceeds to its obligation to Agricredit or to piace said monies in a trust account as required 
by the agreements with Agricredit. 
. . 7: On August 29, 2008 McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as William and 
Roberta in their individual capacities. McCormick moved for summary judgment on May 20, 
2010. McConnick's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted June 10, 2010. Judgment was 
entered against Bear River, William and Roberta on June 29, 2010 in the sum of $319,977.98. 
On August 12, 2010, attorney fees and costs were awarded to McCormick and an Amended 
Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta in the amount of $342,417.42. 
8. The Judgment related to five (5) tractors and three (3) loaders. The proceeds from the 
sale of this equipment were not paid over to Agricredit as required by the agreements between 
Bear River and Agricredit. The Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements for each of these 
items of equipment are listed and identified in the Affidavit of Kevin Peters and are summarized 
as follows: 
Serial No. Model No. Date Financed 
JJE2026767 MC 115 Tractor 10/23/06 
JJE3337250 MTX135 Tractor. 12/21/06 
JJE333-7193 MTX120 Tractor 12/21/06 
7183970 MCQL145 Loader 12/21/06 
JJE2059356 CX105 Tractor 1/04/07 
JJE2058843 CXSS Tractor 3/15007 
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9. One of the eight (8) pieces of equipment was financed prior to William and Roberta's 
divorce. The tractor financed before the finalization of the divorce· was financed in the amount 
. of $48,146.54. See Defendant's Exhibit 203. The amount claimed due in the demand letter to 
Roberta was $43,331.89.3 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 105. The remaining seven (7) items were all 
financed after the divorce, 
10. fn March, 2006, William and Roberta separated. Roberta engaged Bokides to 
represent her in the divorce proceeding. Roberta met with Bokides on three (3) occasions 
between March, 2006 when the parties separated- and. May, 2006. During the course of these 
three (3) meetings with Bokides, Roberta testified that she provided Bokides with documents 
relatin~ to Bear River. Among these documents were three (3) guaranteea William and Roberta 
had signed on behalf of Bear River, one of these three (3) guarantees was the guarantee with 
Agricredit. Roberta testified and this Court accepts her testimony that the latest she would have 
brought the guarantees to Bokides would have been the last of the three (3) initial meetings in 
May, 2006. 
11. During one of these three (3) meetings which occurred. between March and May of 
2006, Roberta asked that she be removed from anything concerning Bear River and that the 
business and the real property where the business was located be given to William in the divorce 
proceeding. Roberta also testified and the Court finds as true her testimony that in one of the 
3 Bokides did not put on any evidence at trial concerning. how much of the ultimate judgJ1lent entered against Bear 
River; William and Roberta was attributable to interest on principal amount of this one tractor which was financed 
before the divorce was final · 
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three (3) meetings between March and May 2006 that she asked Bokides to notify Agricredit and 
McCormick in writing that she wished to terminate her obligation under the guarantees. 
12. Both Roberta and Bokides testified that Bokides agreed to so notify Agricredit and 
McCormick in writing of her decision to terminate the personal guarantees. Roberta also 
testified that .this consent occurred during one of the three (3) meetings between March,· 2006 and 
May 2006. 4-
13. There was no specific date or timeline discussed between Roberta and Bokides 
concerning when this notification of termination in writing to Agricredit and McCormick would 
occur. Roberta testified at the time the divorce was being initiated that there were no exigent 
circumstances regarding Bear River and its finances that caused her concern or a desire for 
immediate. removal. However, Roberta testified that she did not see why Bokides could not have. 
sent the letters to Agricredit and McCormick immediately. She also acknowledged upon cross 
examination that she expected that the letters terminating the guarantees would be accomplished 
during the course of the divorce and that it would all be done by the time. the divorce was 
completed. 
14. Bold.des did not send the letters he was instructed to send to Agricredit or 
McConnick revoking Roberta's personal guarantees. 
15. The parties' Divorce Decree was entered on November 16, 2006. 
4 Although Bokides did not dispute the fact that he agreed to write the. letters, he did contend that he declined to 
write them until the. divorce was concluded, Bokides' testimony regarding the timing of his -performance was that it 
would not be. done until after the divorce was finalized, However, the. Court does not accept this version of the 
events. Roberta denies that Bokides ever discussed with her that he had concerns about this request or that he 
declined to perform this_ request until after the divorce was fmalized. In fact, she testified that in meetings with 
Bo.kides after she received a demand letter from McConnick- for payment under the Guaranty, Bokides never 
suggested- that he. had refused to tender the written notification regarding terminating the guarantees until after 
divorce. She testified that the first time she learned of this position was when Bokides filed his affidavit in June of 
201 O, The Court finds Roberta's testimony in this respect mote credible. 
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16. One of the provisions of the parties' Divorce Decree requires William to defend and 
hold Roberta harmless from any indebtedness "related to the closely held corporation Bear River 
Farm Equipment, Inc., including but not limited to, any claims or litigation against the parties 
arising out of the business operated by Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc. including attorney fees 
and co!rts." See Decree of Divorce, Exhibit 103. 
17. In August 2007, Roberta Shore received a demandletterrelative to the guarantee she 
had signed with Agricredit. This is when Roberta first discovered that Bokides had failed to 
send written notice terminating her from the Agricredit Guaranty. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 105. 
18. Despite the hold harmless provision contained in her decree of divorce Roberta 
testified that she believed suing William pursuant to the hold harmless clause was a futile act and 
would not result in he~ being-held harmless. Rather, she testified it would increase her damages 
by inquiring additional attorney fees and the expenses necessary to obtain a judgment that she 
believed would not be collectable. 
19. Roberta, as a result of fifteen years of marriage to William and being the bookkeeper 
regarding their per~onal assets and affairs, was intimately aware of the assets, liabilities, 
judgments and pending lawsuits of the community. Roberta was also aware of those same 
assets, liabilities, judgments and pending lawsuits after the divorce. In fact, Roberta held a first 
mortgage on the Council Ranch and was a. party to some of the lawsuits. 
20. Both Roberta and William testified as to William's assets, liabilities, judgments and 
' 
pendinglawsuits as follows: 
a. McCormick Judgment in the amount of $342,417.00 
b. Farm Financial Statement (Exhibit 113) 
i. Attorney fees owed to: 
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• Blake Atkin P.d. in the. amount of $45,337.92 See also 
Exhibit 108. 
• Merrill and Merrill in the amount of $66A00.31 See also 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 109. 
• Sparrow &Kunz in the amount of $4,200.00, 
c. Outstanding obligation to the Internal Revenue Service and the Idaho State 
Tax Commission for payroll taxes, high.way taxes, sales tax. and/or use tax 
in excess of$300,000 with potential for personal liability. See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 106, 107 and 113. 
d. Council Ranch was purchased fo:t $700,000 and listed on the fmancial 
statement as having a value. of $1,625 million but in a forced_ Sheriffs sale 
the value would be seriously decreased and at the most would be worth no 
more than the mortgage currently assessed on the property. 
i. Only one viable offer has been. made on the Council Ranch since 
the parties were divorced in the amount of $900,000.00. No other 
viable offers have been made. The Council Ranch is subject to a 
first mortgage to Roberta Shore in the amount of$1.3 million. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 110, 112 and 113. 
e. The Preston Property was purchased for $120,000 and_ is listed on the 
financial statement as having a value of $220,000 but in a forced Sheriffs 
sale the val~ would be seriously decreased and at the most would. be 
worth. no more than the mortgage currently assessed on the property. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 111. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1.· tegalMalpractice 
To establish a claim for legal malpractice, a claimant must prove (1) it had an attomeyM 
client relationship; (2) the existence: of a duty on the part of the attorney; (3) that the attorney 
breached that duty; (4) that the attorney's failure to perform the duty proximately caused 
damages. Spur Products Corp. v Stoel Rives, LLP, 14:! Idaho 812, 153 P.3d 1158, 1162(2007), 
In Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 172, 868 P.2d 496, 500 (1994) (Sohn) the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed the measure of damages in an attorney malpractice action by citing to the case of 
Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1977) "the trier of fact in the malpractice 
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action must decide what the outcome would have been in the underlying action if the lawyer had 
performed properly.'' 
In the present action the Court concludes that Roberta and Bo.kides entered into an 
attorney client relationship in March of 2006. The purpose of that attorney client relationship 
was to provide services to Roberta in the dissolution of her marriage to William and all matters 
incident to that dissolution. Incident to that attorney client relationship Bokides agreed to notify 
Agricredit and McCormick in writing that Roberta was terminating the guarantees she had 
previously signed, This attorney client relationship and the agreement between Roberta and 
Bokides required that he send letters to Agricredit and McCormick incident to his representation 
of Roberta. This created a legal duty on Bold.des part to write said letters to Agricredit and 
McCormick terminating the guarantees. 
No timeframe was established between the parties concerning the performance of this 
obligation Bokides assumed on behalf of Roberta. In Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Cas. 
Ins. Ca., 149 Idaho 299, _, 233 P.3d.1221, 1240 (2010) (Weinstein) the Idaho Supreme Court 
restated the well established rule in Idaho that "where no time is expressed in a contract for its 
performance, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time as determined 
by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending 
the performance," 
In the present case, the Court: concludes that it was reasonable for Bokides to conclude 
that this directive was part of the overall dissolution of the marital relationship. The documents 
regarding the guarantee and Bear River were delivered to him at the same time. Roberta's stated 
objective. in the divorce, in part, was that William receive Bear River and the assets and liabilities 
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associated with that business. The Court concludes that it was consistent with those goals that as 
part of the dissolution of the marital relationship, that business be transferred to William along 
with the obligations and liabilities associated with the same. It also seems ·logical for Bokides to 
conclude that as part of his responsibilities of transitioning the business and its assets and 
liabilities to William that he would need to send the letters terminating Roberta's guarantees to 
Agricredit and McConnick as part of the dissolution process. As such, this Court concludes that 
a. "reasonable time for performance" taking into account the factors enunciated in Weinstein was 
that Roberta's termination letters be sent to Agricredit and McCormick before the divorce was 
concluded, November 16, 2006. 
Bokides never sent the letters terminating the guarantees to either Agricredit or 
McCormick as. he was obligated to do during the performance of his duties as counsel for 
Roberta. As a result Bokides breached his duty to Roberta. 
This failure to send the letters on the part ofBokides was a proximate cause of Roberta's 
being sued under the guarantees and the resultant judgment against Roberta in favor of 
McCormi.ck. 
This Court has concluded that the "reasonable time" for Bokides to have performed 
would have been by the conclusion of the divorce. Because the portion of the McCormick 
Judgmentthatrelated to the tractorthatwas financed prior to November 16, 2007, that portion of 
the judgment was not proximately caused by Bokides' breach. However, the remaining seven 
(7) pieces of farm equipment which were financed by Bear River after the parties' divorce and 
that portion of the McConnick Judgment related to them were proximately caused by Bok.ides' 
breach. In considering the language of the Idaho Supreme Court found in Sohn, supra., this 
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Court can reach no other conclusion. Had Bokides timely performed his obligation incident to 
his representation of Roberta in this dissolution proceeding she would not have had a judgment 
entered against her personall:y for seven. (7) of these fann implements floored and financed by 
Bear River through Agricredit. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the tractor, serial number JJE2026767, and the 
judgment entered against Roberta for the same was not proximately caused by Bokides' 
malpractice, The sum claimed by McCormick in the demand letter dated August 301 2007 
relative to this tractor was $43,331.89. As was stated in the Findings of Fact, footnote 3 because 
there was no evidence separating out what portion of the McCormick Judgment was attributable 
to interest on this tractor, the Court cannot r~duce the judgment by that amount. 
Therefore, this Court concludes that $299,085.53 ofthe$342,417.42judgmentin favor of 
McCormick against Roberta was a proximate result ofBokides' breach. Therefore, Roberta was 
damaged in the amountof$299,085.53 when the: McConnick Judgment was entered. 
Z. Failure to Mitigate Damages 
Bokides has asserted as an affirmative defense that Roberta's recovery should be barred 
due to her failure to mitigate damages. A defendant who asserts this_ affirmative defense bears 
the burden of proof on this issue. Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 Idaho 129, 136, 910 P.2d 801, 808 
(Ct.App. 1996) (Whitehouse). 
Bokides argues that the evidence introduced at trial establishes that Roberta. should be 
barred from recovering damages because she failed to attempt to recover from William. The 
evidence clearly established thatincidentto the dissolution of the parties' marriage William was 
obligated to pay the debts of Bear River. It was also established that he would hold Roberta 
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harmless for any of the debts of Bear River. The evidence at trial also established that Roberta 
had made no attempt to enforce this post divorce obligation against William. It is from this 
failure that Bokides argues Roberta has failed to mitigate her damages. 
I.n defense of Bokides' affirmative defense, Roberta has argued that she "acted 
reasonably in electing not to pursue William. She also argues that this personal guarantee. was 
not a debt arising from Bear River but that it was her own personal obligation and that she 
therefore had no ability to require that William hold her harmless or indemnify her with respect 
to this debt. The Court need not address the latter of these two positions based upon its 
conclusions oflaw regarding the first argument. 
IDil 9.14 contains the pattern jury instruction for mitigation of damages. It provides as 
follows: 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to 
exercise such care cannot be recovered. 
The issue of mitigation of damages has been specifically addressed.. in the case of O'Neil v. 
Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134 (Ct.App.1990) (O'Neil). In O'Neil the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated as follows: 
"If an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with 
an alternative remedy or remedies which are both viable and equh'alent, the 
result may be that the client suffers no loss or a. reduced loss as the proximate 
cause of the attorney's negligent conduct." Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W,2d 
654, 658 (N.D.1989). Here, O'Neil had a duty to mitigate' the damages he could 
have suffered by Vasseur and Gissel's breach of the attorney-client relationship 
contract O'Neil did so. He pursued the Schuckardt case: pro se and was awarded 
damages therein. Therefore, due to O'Neil's pursuits, no compensable damages 
arose from the breach of contract by Vasseur and Gissel. [Bold Emphasis Added] 
118 Idaho at 262-63. 
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The Court finds the language in both IDJI 9 .14 and O'Neil very insightful and helpful in 
addressing the mitigation issue in the present controversy. IDJl 9.14 provides that one "must 
exercise ordinary care to prevent damage and minimize future damage" and O'Neil provides if 
''an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with an alternative 
remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result may be that the client suffers 
no loss as the proximate loss of the attorneys negligent conduct." 
In this case, applying the facts as testified to by Roberta and William as well as the 
documentary evidence introduced at trial, this Court cannot conclude that Roberta's 
determination not to pursue William was not an exercise of ordinary care. Rather it seems to 
have been a knowing and intelligent decision based upon her, knowledge of the circumstances 
surrounding- his finances. In fact, had she spent many thousands of dollars pursuing William just 
to obtain an uncollectable judgment, one might argue under the same principle of mitigation that 
she failed to mitigate her damages by pursuing a lawsuit, which would likely be an element of 
damage in her malpractice action,. with no hope of recovering the mone'y. 
Therefore, this Court concludes based upon the facts of this case that Roberta did not 
have "alternative remedies" which were "both viable and equivalent." Rather she was faced with 
the prospect of incumng additional expenses and attorney fees to pursue what she knew to be a 
judgment proof individual from her own personal knowledge arising qut of her fifteen year 
marriage and the finances associated with the dissolution of that marriage. 
This Court concludes that Roberta's actions in this- respect were taken in the exercise of 
due care. The Court declines Bokides' request to bar or reduce Roberta's damages in this matter: 
The Courtfmds this case to be somewhat analogous with the conclusions of the Court of Appeals 
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in. Whitehouse. In Whitehouse, the buyers of 0.-broodmare brought an action against sellers, after 
it was discovered that the mare could not reproduce. The sellers asserted the affirmative defense 
of mitigation alleging that buyers should have taken the mare to a reproductive center or had 
fertility testing conducted. However, the Court of Appeals in ruling on this issue stated: 
, However, at trial, he did not present evidence that such evaluation likely would 
have led to a cure: for the mare's .infertility, nor did he show the probable cost of 
such testing. Therefore, Lange didnot satisfy his burden to prove:that Revelation. 
Prophecy could have been restored to fitness as a broodmare and the 
Whitehouses' damages thereby lessened. Because there is insufficient evidence to 
support a.finding in favor of Lange on his allegation that the Whitehouses failed 
to mitigate damages, the absence of a finding by the trial court on this defense 
will be disregarded. 
128 Idaho at 136. Utilizing the same rationale, this Court concludes Bokides did not 
present sufficient evidence at trial that Roberta's pursuit of William would have lead to a 
. . 
collectible judgment that would have satisfied or- decreased her liability to McConnick. 
Rather the evidence at trial and this Court's findings of fact support the opposite 
conclusion that it would only have added to the already disastrous financial status of 
William and placed Roberta in line with a handful of other creditors attempting to collect 
money and judgments against him. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
hereby ORDERS that Third-Party Defendant Nicholas Bokides' Motion to Amend 
Answer is GRANTED and the Franklin County Clerk shall accept and file this 
document 
The Court finds that Bokides breached his duty to send letters to Agricredit and 
McCon;nick terminating Roberta's guarantees. That as a result of this breach Roberta has 
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suffered damages in the sum of $299,085.S3 plus interest on this amount from the date of 
judgment at the statutory rate. The Court finds that Roberta did not fail to mitigate her 
damages in this matter- and therefore Bok:ides affirmative defense is DENIED. 
Finally, based upon the foregoing the Court finds Roberta to be the prevailing 
parcy, in 1;his litigation. 
Upon the submission of an appropriate form of judgment the Court will sign the 
same. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 18 
8 l . d LE 8 ·o N 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below, I served a true and conect copy of the 
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Bradley Q; Williams 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORcv11CK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-327 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES' AMENDED 
ANS\VER TO THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS BOKIDES' AMENDED Al~SWER TO 
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Colb 
ROBERTA SHORE, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third-Party Defendant, 
COMES NOW the third-party defendant, Nicholas Bokides, by and through 
undersigned counsel, and as his answer to the Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
responds and alleges as follows. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
I. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted and therefore should be dismissed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
II. 
Third-Party Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Third-Party 
Complaint that is not specifically and expressly admitted in this answer. 
III. 
Third-Party Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraphs 1,2, 3, and 4 of the 
Third-Party Complaint. 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS BOK.IDES' AMENDED ANs,vER TO 
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IV. 
Responding to Paragraph 5 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant 
states that the personal guarantee speaks for itself. All other allegations contained therein are 
denied. 
V. 
Responding to Paragraph 6 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant 
states that Third-Party Plaintiff delivered a letter addressed to Agri Credit Corporation for 
mailing by Third-Party Defendant. All other allegations contained therein are denied. 
VI. 
Responding to Paragraph 7 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant 
states that he failed to mail Third-Party Plaintiffs letter addressed to Agri Credit Corporation as 
requested. Third-Party Defendant denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph. 
VII. 
Responding to Paragraph 8 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant 
states that the allegations are a matter or record and further states that he lacks sufficient 
information and knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations and therefore denies 
the same. 
VIII. 
Third-Party Defendant lacks sufficient information and knowledge to form a 
belief as to the truth of Paragraph 9 of the Third-Party Complaint and therefore denies the same. 
IX. 
Third-Party Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 10 of the Third-Party 
Complaint. 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS BOKIDES' AMENDED ANSWER TO 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
- 3 Client: 17 42438 1 
X. 
Responding to Paragraph 11 of the Third-Party Complaint, Third-Party Defendant 
states that he failed to mail Third-Party Plaintiffs letter addressed to Agri Credit Corporation as 
requested. Third-Party Defendant denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph. 
XI. 
Third-Party Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the 
Third-Party Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XII. 
Recovery against the Third-Party Defendant is barred because no act or omission 
of the Third-Party Defendant caused or contributed to any of Third-Party Plaintiffs alleged 
inJuries or damages. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XIII. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs damages, if any, were proximately caused by the 
negligence or fault of parties, persons or entities other than the Third-Party Defendant, including 
the Third-Party Plaintiff. The negligence or fault of all persons must be compared under the 
comparative negligence laws of the state ofldaho. In asserting this defense, the Third-Party 
Defendant does not admit that he was guilty of any negligent or culpable conduct and, to the 
contrary, expressly denies any such conduct on his part. 
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adjudication. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XIV. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
xv. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs action is prematurely brought and is not ripe for 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XVI. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs former spouse, William R. Shore, agreed to pay when due 
and indemnify and hold Third-Party Plaintiff harmless from all indebtedness related to Bear 
River Equipment, Inc., including attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, William R. Shore is the 
person primarily responsible for Third-Party Plaintiffs injuries alleged in the Third-Party 
Complaint. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XVII. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs claims, or some of them, are barred to the extent they are 
beyond the scope of Third-Party Defendant's representation. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XVIII. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs damages, if any, are subject to the limitation on non-
economic damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1603. 
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XIX. 
Third-Party Defendant met the standard of practice applicable to him as an 
attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho. At the time and place of the alleged 
malpractice, and at all times, Third-Party Defendant used reasonable care and diligence in the 
exercise of his judgment, skill, and the application of his learning in accordance with his best 
judgment and the consent of Third-Party Plaintiff. Third-Party Defendant in no way breached or 
deviated from the standard of care. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
xx. 
Third-Party Plaintiff's claims may be barred by the statute of limitations. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXI. 
Third-Party Plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
XXII. 
By raising the above defenses, Third-Party Defendant makes no admission of any 
kind and does not assume any burdens of proof or production not otherwise properly resting 
upon him in this lawsuit. Rather, Third-Party Defendant merely identifies defenses to preserve 
them for all proper uses under applicable law. Third-Party Defendant has yet to complete 
discovery in this case, the result of which may reveal additional defenses to the Third-Party 
Plaintiff's Complaint. As such, Third-Party Defendant reserves the right to supplement, modify, 
or delete defenses after discovery is completed. 
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WHEREFORE, Third-Party Defendant prays for judgment: 
1. Dismissing the Third-Party Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice, without 
granting any of the relief requested against the Third-Party Defendant; 
2. Awarding Third-Party Defendant his reasonable costs and attorney fees 
incurred in defending this action; 
circumstances. 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable under the 
DATED this L day of August, 2010. 




Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ___.1!j_ day of August, 2010, I caused a trne 
and correct copy of the foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT NICHOLAS BOK.IDES' 
AMENDED ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Steven R. Fuller 
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83262 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
James G. Reid 
Laura E. Burri 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 S. Third 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, lD 83701-2773 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
Attorneys/or Defendcmts and 
Third-Partv Plaintiff Roberta Shore 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
District Judge 
159 South Main 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Chambers Copy 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Bradley J Williams 
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THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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JAMES G. REID, ISB #1372 
S. BRYCE FARRIS, ISB #5636 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 S. Third, P. 0. BOX 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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UPON CONSIDERATION of the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Memorandum Decision and Order entered November 15, 2010, and good cause 
appearing for the relief set forth herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be and is hereby 
entered in favor of the Third-Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore, and against Third-Party 
Defendant, Nicholas Bokides, in the amount of $299,085.53, plus interest on this 
amount from the date of Judgment at the statutory rate. 
DATED this 2.1 ~ay of November, 2010. 
JUDGIVIENT - 2 
) 
/~/f'///:7,/I/ 
;;3/ Vivi(/~/ ;,rz//. IPJt~~ 
Mitchell W. Brown 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was served upon all parties listed below by: 
() U. S. mail, postage prepaid 
( ) hand delivery 
Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83262 
Ed Cather 
Moffatt, Thomas 
P.O. Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-1505 
James G. Reid 
s. Bryce Farris 
Ringert Law Chartered 
P .o. Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701 
JUDGMENT-3 
( ) express mail 




STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC .. , a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
Corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE, an 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ROBERTA SHORE, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
* * * * * * 
NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2008-327 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court on December 23, 2010 regarding Third-Party Plaintiff's 
request for attorney fees and costs. James G. Reid appeared telephonically for and on behalf of the 
Defendants and the Third-Party Plaintiff, Roberta Shore and Charles Edward Cather II appeared 
telephonically for Third-Party Defendant, Nicholas Bokides. No court reporter was available for this 
hearing and the proceedings were recorded digitally only. All parties waived the presence of a court 
reporter. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER - 1 
bdl 
The Court heard argument regarding said Motion and took this matter under advisement and 
shall issue a decision in due course. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 23, 2010 
;p;/,Ju}~ ~ 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on January 10, 2011, I mailed/served/faxed a true copy of the 
foregoing document on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage 
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Attorney( s )/Person(s): 
James G. Reid 
Attorney for Roberta Shore 
Charles Edward Cather III 
Attorney for Nicholas Bokides 
MINlJTE ENTRY AND ORDER - 2 
Method of Service: 
Faxed: (208) 342-4657 
Faxed: 522-5111 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN, Clerk 
-
: I I I \ 
By·. -f( f '\(1ff1! M/'l. I "I~ nlz\(\ I ,vi_\£:: !:::j.!IL __ J,.1.,_,, 
Linda Hampton, D~puty · 
Bradley J Williams, ISB No. 4019 
Charles Edward Cather III, ISB No. 6297 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
420 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone (208) 522-6700 
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McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
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VS. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIAi\1 R. SHORE, an 
individual; and ROBERTA SHORE, an 
individual. 
Defendants. 
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NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third-Party 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, ROBERTA SHORE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Nicholas Bokides, appeals against the above-
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lmv, 
and Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 15, 2010 and the Judgment entered 
on November 30, 2010, in and for the County of Bonneville, Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
presiding. 
2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
final judgment described in Paragraph 1 is an appealable judgment under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule l l(a)(l). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant 
intends to assert on appeal include: 
• Did the District Court err in finding that Roberta Shore mitigated her 
damages? 
• Did Roberta Shore's failure to retain independent counsel prohibit her 
from taking any steps to mitigate her damages because of a non-
consentable conflict of interest? 




• Did the District Court err in declining to bar or reduce Roberta's damages 
based on William Shore's duty to indemnify as set forth in the Divorce 
Decree? 
In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17(f), Appellant reserves the right to modify or amend 
this list of issues, or to assert other issues. 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested. Appellant requests the preparation of 
the following portions of the reporter's transcript: the standard reporter's transcript in entirety as 
defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(c) supplemented by the following: 
• April 8, 2010 Hearing; 
• June 10, 2010 Hearing; 
• June 21, 2010 Hearing; 
• July 23, 2010 Hearing; and 
• August 24, 2010 Trial. 
5. Appellant requests those documents which are automatically included 
under Idaho Appellate Rule 28 be included in the clerk's record. Appellant also requests the 
following documents be included in the clerk's record(dates are those on which the pertinent 
documents were filed or served): 
• 3/12/2010: Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 3/12/2010: Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
• 3/12/2010: Affidavit of Bradley J. Williams; 
• 3/12/2010: Notice of Hearing; 
• 3/24/2010: Roberta Shore's Response and Opposition to Third Party 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 3/24/2010: Affidavit of Bryce Farris; 
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• 4/01/10: Third Party Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 4/8/10: Minute Entry and Order; 
• 5/20/10: Notice of Hearing; 
• 5/20/10: Affidavit of Jean Cosbey 
• 5/20/10: Affidavit of Kevin Peters 
• 5/20/10: Affidavit of Gregg Briggs 
• 5/20/10: Motion for Summary Judgment 
• 5/20/10: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
• 5/26/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 5/26/10: Memorandum in Support of Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
• 5/26/10: Affidavit of James G. Reid; 
• 5/26/10: Notice of Hearing; 
• 6/07/10: Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
• 6/11/10: Bokides' Memorandum in Opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 6/11/10: Affidavit of C. Edward Cather; 
• 6/11/10: Affidavit of Nicholas T. Bokides; 
• 6/14/10: Motion to Strike; 
• 6/14/10: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike; 
• 6/16/10: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike: 
• 6/17/10: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike: 
• 6/22/10: Minute Entry and Order; 
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• 6/29/10: Judgment and Order; 
• 7/29/10: Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions for Summary 
Judgment: 
• 8/4/10: Joint Pre-Trial Stipulation; 
• 8/13/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief; 
• 8/13/10: Third Party Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief; 
• 8/16/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Proposed Exhibit List: 
• 8/17/10: Third Party Defendant's Exhibit List; 
• 8/24/10: Minute Entry and Order; 
• 8/24/10: Motion to Amend Answer; 
• 8/24/10: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Answer; 
• 9/7/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Final Argument; 
• 9/7/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Post-Trial Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law; 
• 9/14/10: Third Party Defendant's Proposed Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law; 
• 9/14/10: Third Party Defendant's Closing Argument; 
• 9/20/10: Third Party Plaintiffs Post-Trial Reply Brief; and 
• 11/15/10: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum 
Decision and Order; and 
• 11/30/2010: Judgment. 
6. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, Appellant requests that all tapes and 
exhibits, including charts, graphs or other documents, offered and admitted during the 
proceedings, whether hearing or trial, be included as exhibits to the record. 
7. I certify that: 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) The court reporter of the district court has been sent the estimated 
fee for the preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
paid; 
to Rule 20. 
(c) The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record is being 
( d) The Appellant's filing fees have been paid; 
( e) Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By c:&;c:2ciZ-
C. Edward Cather - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Nicholas Bokides 
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correct copy of the foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL to be 
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James G. Reid 
Laura E. Burri 
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455 S. Third 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701-2773 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiff Roberta Shore 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
District Judge 
159 South Main 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Chambers Copy 
Steven R. Fuller 
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83262 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Dorothy Snarr 
Snarr Stenography and Transcription 
POB 306 
Grace, ID 83241 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
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(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
C. Edward Cather 
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NICHOLAS BOK.IDES, an individual 
Third-Party Defendant. 
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MOFFATT TI-IOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS Chartered 
PO BOX 51505 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Counsel for Respondents: James G. Reid 
RINGERT LAW Chartered 
PO Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701-2773 
Appealed against: Roberta Shore, an individual 
Notice of Appeal filed: January 10, 2011 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Name of Court Reporter: TBD 
Dated this 18th day of January, 2011. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
SHA1)NA T. GEDDES, Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC1:.QF,THE,,q y CLER¥, 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFF~~~; - . ·'1ct . 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC .. , a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 




NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third Party Defendant-Appellant. 
* * * * * * 
Supreme Court No. 38454-2011 
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327 
AMENDED 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable MITCHELL W. BROWN 
Case number from court: CV-2008-327 
att>tin 
Order or judgment appealed from: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated November 15, 2010 and Judgment 
dated November 30, 2010 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
Counsel for Appellants: C. Edward Cather 
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS Chartered 
PO BOX 51505 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Counsel for Respondents: James G. Reid 
RINGERT LAW Chartered 
PO Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701-2773 
Appealed against: Roberta Shore, an individual 
Notice of Appeal filed: January 10, 2011 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Name of Court Reporter: Linda Larsen 
594 Randolph Avenue 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Dated this 26th day of January, 2011. 
SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
JAMES G. REID, ISB #1372 
S. BRYCE FARRIS, ISB #5636 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 S. Third, P. 0. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FILED 
QR\GJij;~~7 A~11,os 
. -- jjJ" Glt: 
;;f:;'/J"j ( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 11\J AND FOR THE COUI\JTY OF FRANKLIN 
MCCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC., a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BEAR RIVER EQUIPMEI\JT, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIAM R. SHORE an 
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NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual, ) 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT, NICHOLAS BOKIDES 
AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, BRADLEY J. 
WILLIAMS AND CHARLES EDWARD CATHER, 111,AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEl'J THAT: 
1. The above-named Cross-Appellant, Roberta Shores, appeals against the 
above-named Cross-Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Laws, and Memorandum Decision and Order entered on 
November 15, 2010 and the Judgment entered on November 30, 2010, in and for the 
County of Bonneville, Honorable Mitchell W. Brown presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the Judgment or Orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(I), I.AR.. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Cross-
Appellant intends to assert on appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the Cross-Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal; 
(a) Did the District Court err in ruling that Roberta Shore's damages 
did not include the amount due to McCormick for the tractor that was floored on or 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL· 2 
<olfl 
about October 28, 2007? 
4. An additional reporter's transcript is not requested. 
5. The Cross-Appellant requests the following documents to be included in 
the Clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR., and 
those designated by the Appellant in the initial Notice of Appeal: None. 
6. The Cross-Appellant requests the following documents, charts or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition 
to those requested in the original Notice of Appeal: None. 
/JcJ Dated this4day of January, 2011. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _0l),day of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served upon al~i~s listed below by: 
(1U. S. mail, postage prepaid () express mail 
( ) hand delivery ( ) facsimile 
Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North state 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83262 
Ed Cather 
Moffatt, Thomas 
P.O. Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1505 
Honorable Mitchell w. Brown 
District Judge 
159 south Main 
Soda springs, ID 83276 
I\JOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4 
FILED 
1 l JAN 28 PM ~: 24 
IN Tiffi DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRIG-l QF,J® _ .. 
rrs,sr,i'\c.,r'; ,_ . .;JiF'( CLERl\ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC .. , a corporation 
Plaintiff1/Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 




BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 




NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third Party Defendant-Appellant. 
* * * * * * 
Supreme Court No. 38454-2011 
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327 
SECOND AMENDED 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable MITCHELL W. BROWN 
Case number from court: CV-2008-327 
Order or judgment appealed from: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated November 15, 2010 and Judgment 
dated November 30, 2010 
SECOND AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAfu({<.f 
Counsel for Appellants: C. Edward Cather 
Counsel for Cross/ Appellant: James G. Reid 
Appealed against: Roberta Shore, an individual 
Notice of Appeal filed: January 10, 2011 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: January 27, 2011 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Name of Court Reporter: Linda Larsen 
594 Randolph A venue 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Dated this 28th day of January, 2011. 
SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk 
By iuxdb {+@012Pr1 
~ I 
Linda Hampton, Deputy Clerk 
SECOND AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC., a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 




NICHOLAS BOKIDES, an individual 
Third Party Defendant-Appellant-
Cross Respondent. 
* * * * * * 
Supreme Court No. 38454-201 l 
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the following is a list of 
exhibits which were offered or admitted into evidence during the hearing in this cause: 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL EXHIBIT BINDER 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S TRIAL EXHIBITS BINDER 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - <3 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 15 day of March, 20 I I. 
SHAUNA T. GEDDES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By___._~.!.......:::::....::..._--'--....:..-=..1c....:....:._f-----=---------'-
Linda Hampton, Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - q 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKUN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
fNC .. , a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 




BEAR RIVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 








Supreme Court No. 38454-20 I I 
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
l, SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above-
entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly 
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as 
required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- ID 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Preston, 
ldaho, this day of March, 2011. 
SHAUNA T. GEDDES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By~~------------1~~-
Linda Hampton, Deputy C erk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - I I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
McCORMICK INTERNATIONAL USA, 
INC.., a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 




BEAR RJVER EQUIPMENT, INC., a 








Supreme Court No. 38454-2011 
Franklin Co. No. 2008-327 
Certificate of Service 
I, Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, 
by United States Mail, one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD to 
each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
C. Edward Cather 
Attorney for Appellants 
PO Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, TD 83405 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ' 
James G. Reid 
Attorney for Respondents 
PO Box2773 
Boise, ID 83701-2773 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this :JJ day of March, 2011. 
SHAUNA T. GEDDES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By __ 
Linda Hampton, Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE r., 
